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In late summer 1999, the first domestically acquired human cases of West Nile (WN) 
encephalitis were documented in the U.S.1-6  The discovery of virus-infected, overwintering 
mosquitoes during the winter of 1999-2000 presaged renewed virus activity for the following 
spring and precipitated early season vector control and disease surveillance in New York City 
(NYC) and the surrounding areas.7, 8  These surveillance efforts were focused on identifying and 
documenting WN virus (WNV) infections in birds, mosquitoes and equines as sentinel animals 
that could alert health officials to the occurrence of human disease.  Surveillance tracked the 
spread of WNV throughout much of the U.S. between 2000 and 2002.  By the end of 2002, 
WNV activity had been identified in 44 states and the District of Columbia.  The 2002 WNV 
epidemic and epizootic resulted in reports of 4,156 reported human cases of WN disease 
(including 2,942 meningoencephalitis cases and 284 deaths), 16,741 dead birds, 6,604 infected 
mosquito pools, and 14,571 equine cases.  The 2002 WNV epidemic was the largest 
recognized arboviral meningoencephalitis epidemic in the Western Hemisphere and the largest 
WN meningoencephalitis epidemic ever recorded.  Significant human disease activity was 
recorded in Canada for the first time, and WNV activity was also documented in the Caribbean 
basin and Mexico.  In 2002, 4 novel routes of WNV transmission to humans were documented 
for the first time: 1) blood transfusion, 2) organ transplantation, 3) transplacental transfer, and 4) 
breast-feeding.   
 
WNV is a member of the family Flaviviridae (genus Flavivirus).  Serologically, it is a member of 
the Japanese encephalitis virus antigenic complex, which includes St. Louis, Japanese, Kunjin, 
and Murray Valley encephalitis viruses.9,10  WNV was first isolated in the WN province of 
Uganda in 1937.11,12  Human and equine outbreaks have been recorded in portions of Africa, 
southern Europe, North America, and Asia.13,14  
 
Although it is still not known when or how WNV was introduced into North America, international 
travel of infected persons to New York, importation of infected birds or mosquitoes, or migration 
of infected birds are all possibilities.  In humans, WNV infection usually produces either 
asymptomatic infection or mild febrile disease, sometimes accompanied by rash, but it can 
cause severe and even fatal diseases in a small percentage of patients.  The human case-
fatality rate in the U.S. has been 7% overall, and among patients with neuroinvasive WNV 
disease, 10%. 
 
Unlike WNV within its historical geographic range, or St. Louis encephalitis (SLE) virus in the 
Western Hemisphere, mortality in a wide variety of bird species has been a hallmark of WNV 
activity in the U.S. The reasons for this are not known; however, public health officials have 
been able to use bird mortality (particularly birds from the family Corvidae) to effectively track 
the movement of WNV. WNV has now been shown to affect 162 species of birds.  Previous 
early-season field studies have determined that areas with bird mortality due to WNV infection 
were experiencing ongoing enzootic transmission.  However, most birds survive WNV infection 
as indicated by the high seroprevalence in numerous species of resident birds within the 
regions of most intensive virus transmission. The contribution of migrating birds to natural 




WNV has been transmitted principally by Culex species mosquitoes, the usual vectors of SLE 
virus.  Thirty-six species of mosquitoes have been shown to be infected with WNV.  This wide 
variety of WNV-infected mosquito species has widened this virus host-range in the U.S.: 27 
mammalian species have been shown to be susceptible to WNV infection and disease has 
been reported in 20 of these (including humans and horses).  It must be remembered, however, 
that the detection of WNV in a mosquito species is necessary but not sufficient to implicate that 
species as a competent vector of WNV.  
 
Since 1999, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and a variety of other U.S. 
governmental agencies and partners have sponsored yearly national meetings of 
arbovirologists, epidemiologists, laboratorians, ecologists, vector-control specialists, wildlife 
biologists, communication experts, and state and local health and agriculture officials to assess 
the implications of the WNV introduction into the U.S. and to refine the comprehensive national 
response plan.  Recommendations from these meetings have been used to develop and to 
update these guidelines.15,16  This document is available electronically from the CDC Web site 
at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/publications.htm. 
 
To assist guideline implementation in 2000, CDC developed an electronic-based surveillance 
and reporting system (ArboNet) to track WNV activity in humans, horses, other mammals, birds 
and mosquitoes.  In 2003, the ArboNet surveillance system has been updated to streamline 
reporting to CDC of WNV activity by the state public health departments. 
 
Today=s rapid transport of people, animals, and commodities increase the likelihood that other 
introductions of exotic pathogens will occur.  CDC continues to implement its plan titled 




I.    SURVEILLANCE 
 
A universally applicable arbovirus surveillance system does not exist.  In any given 
jurisdiction, surveillance systems should be tailored according to the probability of arbovirus 
activity and available resources. In jurisdictions without pre-existing vector-borne disease 
surveillance and control programs, newly developed avian-based and/or mosquito-based 
arbovirus surveillance systems will be required.  In some, resurrection of previously 
abandoned systems will be necessary.  In others, modification and/or strengthening of 
existing arbovirus surveillance systems (i.e., those intended to monitor eastern equine 
encephalitis [EEE], western equine encephalitis [WEE], and/or St. Louis encephalitis [SLE] 
virus activity) will be the most appropriate response.  In yet other jurisdictions in which the 
probability of arbovirus activity is very low and/or resources to support avian-based and/or 
mosquito-based surveillance are unavailable, laboratory-based surveillance for neurologic 
disease in humans and equines should be employed at minimum.  
 
Seasonality of surveillance activities may vary depending upon geographic region.  With the 
anticipated spread of West Nile virus (WNV) to all of the 48 contiguous United States in 
2003, all states should initiate surveillance after mosquitoes become active in the spring.  
 
Appropriate and timely response to surveillance data is the key to preventing human and 
animal disease associated with WNV and other arboviruses.  That response must include 
effective mosquito control and public education without delay, if an increasing intensity of 
virus activity is detected by bird- or mosquito-based surveillance systems (see Section 
III.M). For basic information on arbovirus surveillance, see CDC Guidelines for Arbovirus 
Surveillance Programs in the United States,18 this document can be obtained from CDCs 
Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, Fort Collins, Colorado, and is also available 
from the CDC Web site at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/arbor/arboguid.htm.   
 
A. Ecologic Surveillance  
 
 Detection of WNV in bird and mosquito populations helps health officials predict and 
prevent human and domestic animal infections.  Surveillance to detect WNV should 
focus on the avian and mosquito components of the enzootic transmission cycle.  Non-
human mammals, particularly equines, may also serve as effective sentinels because a 
high intensity of mosquito exposure makes them more likely to be infected than people.  
Descriptions of the avian-, mosquito-, and non human mammal-based surveillance 
strategies follow. 
 
 1. Avian 
 
 a) Avian morbidity/mortality surveillance 
 
 Avian morbidity/mortality surveillance appears to be the most sensitive early 
detection system for WNV activity, and should be a component of every states 
arbovirus surveillance program.  Its utility for monitoring ongoing transmission in 
a standardized fashion is currently being investigated, but should include at least 
two basic elements: the timely reporting and analysis of dead bird sightings and 





GOAL OF AVIAN MORBIDITY/MORTALITY SURVEILLANCE:  Utilize bird 
mortality associated with WNV infection as a means of detecting WNV activity in 
a location. 
 
 1) Protocols and specimens 
 
The level of effort involved in this surveillance activity will depend on a risk 
assessment in each jurisdiction. Generally, avian surveillance should be 
initiated when local adult mosquito activity begins in the spring. A database 
should be established to record and analyze dead bird sightings with the 
following suggested data: caller identification and call-back number, date 
observed, location geocoded to the highest feasible resolution, species, and 
condition.  Samples from birds in good condition (unscavenged and without 
obvious decomposition or maggot infestation) may be submitted for 
laboratory testing. As with all dead animals, carcasses should be handled 
carefully, avoiding direct contact with skin.  For greatest sensitivity, a variety 
of bird species should be tested, but corvids should be emphasized.19 The 
number of bird specimens tested will be dependent upon resources and 
whether WNV-infected birds have been found in the area; triage of 
specimens may be necessary on the basis of sensitive species (such as 
corvids) and geographic location.  Many jurisdictions may limit (or even stop) 
avian mortality surveillance once WNV is confirmed in their region. It is 
suggested that avian mortality surveillance be continued in each region as 
long as it remains necessary to know whether local transmission persists, 
because dead-bird-based surveillance is the most sensitive method for 
detection of WNV activity in most regions. 
 
A single organ specimen from each bird is sufficient to detect WNV or viral 
RNA.  Kidneys, brains, or hearts are preferable.20-22 Oral swabs from corvids 
have been validated as a sensitive alternative to organ samples, and 
because fewer resources are necessary to acquire them, oral swabs are the 
preferred specimen from corvid carcasses.23  Testing involves isolation of 
infectious virus, specific RNA detection by reverse transcription-polymerase 
chain reaction (RT-PCR), 24 or antigen detection,25,26 and will generally be 
positive within 1-2 weeks after specimen submission.  
 
 2) Recent experience 
 
 Analysis of recent avian morbidity and mortality data indicated that 
 (a) The American crow was the most sensitive species for avian morbidity/ 
mortality surveillance in northern regions.  However, some areas did not 
have WNV-positive American crows, but only WNV-positive birds of other 
species. In southern regions, blue jays have been more sensitive than 
crows. 
 (b) Almost all of the positive birds were found singly and not as part of a 
mass die-off at a single time and place. 




 (d) Many WNV-positive birds did not have pathology indicative of WNV 
infection on necropsy.  No lesions are pathognomonic for WNV infection. 
 (e) WNV-positive dead birds usually provided the earliest indication of viral 
activity in an area.  In 2002, the detection of WNV-infected dead birds 
was the first positive surveillance event in 1,534 (61%) of 2,531 counties 
reporting WNV activity. 
 (f) The detection of WNV-positive dead birds preceded reports of human 
cases (although knowledge of the test result did not necessarily predate 
the onset of human cases).  In 2002, 527 (89%) of 589 counties reporting 
human WN meningoencephalitis cases first detected WNV transmission 
in animals.  In 327 (72%) of these 527 counties, detection of WNV-
infected dead birds was the first positive surveillance event, preceding 
human illness onset by a median of 38.5 days (range, 2-252 days).  
 (g) Many counties with human cases of WNV infection tended to have high 
dead bird surveillance indices, both WNV-positive and sightings.  Notable 
exceptions included sparsely populated counties, particularly those in the 
midwestern states.27,28 
 (h) Experimental evidence of direct transmission among corvids and gulls 
exists, but whether this occurs in nature is unknown. 29 If it does, then in 
some settings, virus-infected mosquitoes might not be necessary to 
maintain enzootic transmission cycles. 
 
 3) Advantages of avian morbidity/mortality surveillance include the following: 
                                                
 (a) Certain species of birds, in particular corvids (e.g., crows and jays) 
experience high clinical attack rates.  
 (b) The size and coloration of certain dead birds makes them conspicuous 
(e.g., crows).  
 (c) RT-PCR and antigen-detection assays can be used to rapidly detect WN 
viral RNA and protein, respectively, in tissues, even if the tissue is partly 
decomposed. Both assays have now been adapted for field applications. 
 (d) Due to public involvement in reporting dead bird sightings, dead wild birds 
are readily available over a much wider region than can be sampled by 
other surveillance methods. 
 (e) Detection of WNV in dead birds likely signifies local transmission.30 
 (f) This type of surveillance provides a temporally and spatially sensitive 
method for the detection of WNV activity. 
 (g) It can be used for early detection and possibly also for ongoing monitoring 
of WNV transmission. 
 (h) It may be used to estimate risk of human infection with WNV. 27,31,32  
 
 4) Disadvantages of avian morbidity/mortality surveillance include the following: 
 
 (a) Dead bird surveillance data from different jurisdictions are difficult to 
compare. 
 (b) Birds are highly mobile and often have extensive home ranges, so that 
the site of death may be distant from the site of infection (especially after 
the breeding season, when birds are generally less territorial). 
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 (c) Collection, handling, shipping, and processing of birds or their clinical 
specimens is cumbersome.  
 (d) Systems for handling, processing, and testing have at times been 
overwhelmed by high public response and public expectations. 
 (e) The long-term usefulness of this system is uncertain because natural 
selection for disease-resistant birds may occur, populations of susceptible 
species may become very low, or the virus may evolve, resulting in low or 
no avian mortality.  In areas where WNV annually recurs, intense 
environmental sampling might not be as useful. 
 (f) Success is influenced by public participation, which is highly variable, and 
depends on the number of public outreach programs, level of public 
concern, etc. 
 (g) The system may be less sensitive in rural areas, where there are fewer 
persons to observe dead birds over a wider geographic area.  In the 
western U.S., low observer density is coupled with the presence of a 
vector (Culex tarsalis) that is less ornithophilic, resulting in fewer reports 
of dead birds relative to other non-avian surveillance indicators.   
 
 b)  Live bird surveillance 
 
Live-bird surveillance has been used traditionally both to detect and monitor 
arbovirus transmission (e.g., for SLE, EEE and WEE viruses).  Two 
approaches are captive sentinel surveillance (typically using chickens, but 
other species have been used as well), and free-ranging bird surveillance.33  
Both depend on serological testing, which generally requires at least 3 weeks 
to detect and confirm an infection.  Successful application of these 
approaches requires extensive knowledge of local transmission dynamics.  It 
is recommended that further research be done before relying on sentinel 
birds as a primary means of WNV surveillance.  Use of sentinel birds may 
require institutional animal use and care protocols, and other authorization 
permits. 
 
GOAL OF LIVE-BIRD SURVEILLANCE:  Utilize seroconversions in captive or 
free-ranging bird species as indicators of local WNV activity.   
 
 1) Captive sentinel surveillance  
 
Although an ideal captive avian sentinel for WNV -- or any other arbovirus 
 may not exist, such a species would meet the following criteria:  1) is 
universally susceptible to infection,  2) has a 100% survival rate from 
infection and universally  develops easily detectable antibodies, 3)  poses 
no risk of infection to handlers, and  4)  never develops viremia sufficient 
to infect vector mosquitoes.18  Captive sentinels have been effectively 
used to monitor transmission of arboviruses in a standardized fashion, 
including SLE virus in California and Florida, especially in historical 
enzootic transmission foci.  Captive sentinel flocks should be placed in 
likely transmission foci (e.g., near vector breeding sites or adult mosquito 
congregation sites), and presented appropriately to allow feeding by 
enzootic WNV vectors.  Alternatively, pre-existing captive birds (e.g., 






 (a) Protocols and specimens 
Whole blood can be collected and centrifuged for serum.  Serum is 
screened by either hemagglutination inhibition (HI), enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay (ELISA) or plaque-reduction neutralization test 
(PRNT).34  It is important to note that the extraction of avian serum 
samples to remove non specific inhibitors of hemagglutination for use 
in the HI test follows procedures different from those used in tests of 
human serum samples.35  Positive tests must be confirmed by 
neutralization to rule out false positives and cross-reactions due to 
infection with related flaviviruses (e.g., SLE virus).   
 
 (b) Recent experience 
(i) In 2000, sentinel chickens were used in selected counties in New 
York State, New York City (NYC), New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, and Delaware. Small numbers of seroconversions were 
detected late in the season in New Jersey and New York.  As 
used in 2000, chickens were ineffective sentinels. In NYC in 2001, 
sentinel chickens were placed in known transmission foci and 
seroconverted earlier in the season, but not earlier than the first 
human cases. In 2002, hundreds of sentinel chickens in the 
Southeast seroconverted, but these were rarely the earliest 
indicators of WNV activity at the county level. 
(ii)   IgM capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (MAC-ELISA) 
testing of experimentally infected chickens points to the need for 
biweekly sampling of sentinels.36   
(iii) Experimental studies have shown that chickens, pigeons, and 
pheasants (CDC, unpublished data) are candidate sentinels due 
to their susceptibility to infection, low mortality, and relative 
incompetence as amplifying hosts.  However, small amounts of 
WNV were detected in cloacal swabs from infected chickens and 
pigeons.29,37   
(iv) Field studies of avian seroprevalence in Queens in 1999 indicated 
that captive chickens frequently were infected.38  In Staten Island 
in 2000, captive pigeons frequently were infected.39 
      (v) Some mortality in chickens was attributed to WNV at various 
locations in New York State.40 
 
 (c) Advantages of sentinel captive bird surveillance include the following: 
(i) Chickens have been successfully used in flavivirus surveillance for 
over 6 decades. 
 (ii)  Birds are readily fed upon by Culex mosquitoes.  
(iii)  Captive birds can be serially bled, making the geographic location 
of infection definite.  
(iv) The system is flexible and therefore can be expanded and 
contracted as appropriate.  
(v)  Mosquito-abatement districts can maintain and bleed flocks and 
submit specimens for testing.   
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(vi) Collection of specimens is inexpensive compared with the costs of 
free-ranging bird surveillance. 
 
 (d)  Disadvantages of captive sentinel surveillance include the following: 
(i) Sentinel flocks detect only focal transmission, requiring multiple 
flocks be positioned in representative geographic areas.  This is 
particularly true when vector mosquitoes have short flight ranges 
(e.g., Culex pipiens). 
 (ii) Flocks are subject to vandalism and theft.  
 (iii) Flocks must be protected from predators. 
(iv) Flock set-up and maintenance (i.e., birds, cages, feed, 
transportation) are expensive.  Training is required for proper 
maintenance and sampling. 
(v) Pre-existing flocks may already have been exposed due to 
previous local WNV transmission. 
 
 2) Free-ranging bird surveillance   
 
Free-ranging birds provide the opportunity for sampling important 
reservoir host species and may be used both for early detection and for 
monitoring virus activity.  This type of surveillance has been used 
effectively for SLE, EEE and WEE virus surveillance in several states.  In 
each geographic area, the optimal free-ranging bird species to be 
monitored should be determined by serosurveys.  The best species for 
serologic surveillance are those in which infection is rarely, if ever, fatal, 
and population replacement rates are high, ensuring a high proportion of 
uninfected individuals.  
 
 (a) Protocols and specimens 
The use of free-ranging birds requires differentiation of recent 
infection from infections acquired in previous years.  For most 
species, assays for detection of IgM antibody will not be available and 
other tests such as IgG (IgY)-detection ELISAs41,42 and the PRNT34 
must be used to detect WNV-specific antibody.  Antibody-positive 
birds less than 1 year old may be presumed to have been infected 
recently (during current transmission season).  Weak seropositivity in 
very young birds (less than 1 month old) may be due to maternal 
transfer of antibody.  Seroconversion in older birds is also evidence of 
recent transmission, but requires frequent recapture for acquisition of 
multiple specimens from uniquely banded individuals during the 
course of the transmission season.  WNV seropositivity among after-
hatch-year birds, when determined from a single serum specimen, 
should not be interpreted or reported as evidence of recent infection.  
State and federal permits are required for capture and banding of 
federally-protected migratory birds.  
 
 (b) Recent experience  
(i) In urban epizootic transmission foci in NYC, several common 
species (i.e., house sparrows, cardinals, catbirds, mourning 
doves, rock doves) developed high seroprevalence, making them 
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strong candidate sentinels, although other species may be 
important in other locations.38,39 
(ii) A comparison of free-ranging bird surveillance in NYC in 2001 
found that much greater effort was required for this surveillance 
system compared with other surveillance systems (Green Street 
Scientific, LLC, unpublished data).  Similar observations have 
been made in Indiana, Louisiana, New Jersey, Ohio, and Texas. 
 
 (c) Advantages of free-ranging bird surveillance include the following: 
 (i)  It has a long history of successful use in flavivirus surveillance.  
 (ii) Local movement of resident wild birds may increase contact with 
enzootic transmission foci, thus increasing sensitivity (relative to 
captive sentinels).  
 (iii) Set-up or maintenance costs may be minimal. 
 (iv) Its sampling capability is highly flexible. 
 (v) It permits evaluation of herd immunity among important amplifying 
hosts. 
 (vi) Owner confidentiality may be less of an issue. 
 
 (d) Disadvantages of free-ranging bird surveillance include the following: 
 (i) Interpretation of serologic results is complex. 
(ii) Handling and venipuncture of birds increases the risk of exposure 
to pathogens in blood and feces. 
(iii) Movement of free-ranging wild birds makes it impossible to know 
where an infection was acquired. 
(iv) Most birds are protected by federal law, and their collection and 
sampling requires state and federal permits.  Banding permits 
require complex data reporting. 
(v) Training is required for live-trapping, blood-sampling, handling, 
and accurate determination of the species and age of wild birds.  
(vi) It is generally not feasible to serially bleed individual free-ranging 
birds because of low recapture rates (although banding can be 
useful).  
 
 2. Equine 
 
Equines appear to be important sentinels of WNV epizootic activity and human 
risk, at least in some geographic regions.  In addition, equine health is an 
important economic issue.  Therefore, surveillance for equine WNV disease 
should be conducted in jurisdictions where equines are present.  Veterinarians, 
veterinary service societies/agencies, and state agriculture departments are 
essential partners in any surveillance activities involving equine WNV disease.  A 
working surveillance case definition of clinical WNV infection in equines is 
presented in Appendix B. 
 
GOALS OF EQUINE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE:  To use data on equine WNV 
disease cases to assess the threat of human disease, identify geographic areas 
of high risk, and assess the need for and timing of interventions.  
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a) Protocols and Specimens 
1) Serum and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) for antibody testing. Because an 
equine WNV vaccine is now in widespread use, a complete vaccination 
history should accompany all specimens submitted for antibody testing.  
 
2) Necropsy tissues (especially brain and spinal cord) for gross pathology, 
histopathology, RT-PCR, virus isolation, and immunohistochemistry. The 
differential diagnosis of equine encephalitis includes, but is not limited to, 
the other arboviral encephalitides and rabies. 
 
b)  Recent experience 
 
1)   In 2002, equine WNV disease cases were the first indication of WNV 
activity in 95 (16%) of the 589 counties where human disease was 
reported.  The majority of these 95 counties were located in the central 
and western U.S. 
 
2)   In general, equine WNV disease cases have been scattered.  Few case 
clusters have been documented. 
 
3)   In fatal equine WNV disease cases, pathological findings have been non-
specific. Pathognomonic lesions have not been described. 
 
4)   A licensed equine WNV vaccine has been available in the U.S. since 
2001.  No studies of efficacy have been published. 
 
c)   Advantages of equine disease surveillance include the following: 
 
1) Equines are highly conspicuous, numerous, and widely distributed in 
some areas.  They may be particularly useful sentinels in rural areas, 
where dead birds may be less likely to be detected. 
 
2) Some equines are routinely bled and tested for other pathogens. 
 
3) Ill equines have been one of the earliest, if not the earliest, sentinels of 
WNV activity in some geographic areas. 
 
d)  Disadvantages of equine disease surveillance include the following: 
 
1) In some geographic areas, equines may not be an early sentinel (i.e., 
human WNV disease cases may occur simultaneously with or soon after 
equine cases). 
 
2)  Necropsies are expensive and logistically difficult. 
 
          3)  Equines are not present or abundant in many areas of the U.S. (e.g., 
densely populated metropolitan areas), and proximity of equines to 
human populations varies. 
 
4) Widespread use of equine WNV vaccines may decrease the incidence of 





         5)  Because the costs of clinical equine specimen collection and testing are 
usually borne directly by the owner, economic factors work against the 
submission and testing of equine specimens for arboviral infections.  
 
 
e) Minimal components of an equine surveillance program 
1) All equine neurologic disease cases should be promptly reported; the 
equines should be tested for infection with WNV and other arboviruses as 
geographically appropriate, and for rabies.  
 
2) Clusters of equine neurologic disease cases should be promptly 
investigated. 
 
 3. Mosquito 
 
While dead-bird-based surveillance has proven to be the most sensitive method 
of detecting WNV presence in an area, mosquito-based surveillance remains the 
primary tool for quantifying the intensity of virus transmission in an area, and 
should be a mainstay in most surveillance programs for WNV and other 
arboviruses.   
 
GOALS OF MOSQUITO-BASED SURVEILLANCE:  To 1) use data on mosquito 
populations and virus infection rates to assess the threat of human disease; 2) 
identify geographic areas of high risk; 3) assess the need for and timing of 
interventions; 4) identify larval habitats for targeted control; 5) monitor the 
effectiveness of this type of surveillance and improve prevention and control 
measures; and 6) develop a better understanding of transmission cycles and 
potential vector species.    
  
 a) Protocols and specimens  
 1) Adult mosquitoes are collected using a variety of trapping techniques and 
are used to identify the mosquito species and primary vector species 
present in an area and the relative density of those species.  When 
coupled with virus detection protocols, mosquito collections can be 
screened for the presence of virus and provide a quantifiable index of 
WNV activity. Adequate sampling requires trapping regularly at 
representative sites throughout a community, and rapid testing of 
collections of sufficient size to detect low infection rates in the vector 
population.  Minimally, adult mosquito density (number collected per trap 
night) and infection rate (number of individual mosquitoes estimated 
containing WNV per 1,000 specimens tested) should be recorded for 





2) Larval mosquitoes are collected by taking dip samples from a variety of 
habitats to identify species present in the area and to identify mosquito 
sources.  Thorough mapping of larval habitats will facilitate larval control 
or source reduction activities.  In addition, where larval management is 
not feasible, quantitative estimates of larval densities will permit 
anticipation of new adult emergences.  Minimally, the number of larvae 
collected per dip and location where collected should be recorded to 
provide a basis for tracking larval production and association of larval 
density with resulting adult mosquito population density. 
 
 
b)   Recent experience 
1) If mosquito trapping effort is intensive, detection of WNV in mosquitoes 
might precede detection of virus activity by other surveillance tools.  If 
mosquito trapping effort is inadequate, WNV-positive mosquitoes may not 
be detected prior to the identification of a virus in dead bird, sentinel 
animal, or human WNV disease cases. 
 
2)  Moderate to high infection rates sustained for several weeks in  Cx. 
pipiens or Cx. quinquefasciatus  have been associated with subsequent 
human outbreaks. Sustained high infection rates early in the year are 
associated with a higher risk for subsequent outbreaks. 
 
3) Several intense, focal outbreaks during 2002 were associated with 
relatively low vector densities, but with high infection rates in key vector 
species (i.e., infection rates in Cx. pipiens or Cx. quinquefasciatus of 
approximately 10 per 1,000 or greater). 
 
4) Large numbers of WNV-positive Cx. tarsalis pools have been found in 
association with WNV activity in areas where this species is common. 
Meaningful infection rates have not yet been determined. 
 
5) Avian epizootics may occur without demonstrable human WNV infection.  
The epizootics are demonstrated, in part, by detection of WNV-positive 
mosquito pools containing only species that feed predominantly on birds 
(e.g., Cx. restuans). 
 
6) During 1999-2002, WNV was detected in 36 mosquito species in the U.S. 
(see www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/mosquitoSpecies.htm). The vast 
majority of isolates came from Cx. pipiens, Cx. quinquefasciatus and Cx. 
restuans.  Numerous isolates have also come from several potential 
accessory vectors (i.e., Cx. tarsalis, Cx. salinarius, Oc. Ae. albopictus, 
Oc. triseriatus, Ae. vexans, Cx. nigripalpus).  While detection of WNV in 
these species demonstrates intensified virus transmission (i.e., virus in 
primarily mammal-feeding or opportunistic mosquitoes), the contribution 
of these species to human risk is poorly understood.    
 
 c) Advantages of mosquito-based surveillance include the following: 
 1) It may provide the earliest evidence of transmission in an area. 
  
2) It helps establish information on potential mosquito vector species. 
  
3) It provides an estimate of vector species abundance. 
  





5) It provides quantifiable information on potential risk to humans and 
animals. 
 
 6) It provides baseline data that can be used to guide emergency control 
operations. 
  
7) It allows evaluation of control methods. 
 
 d) Disadvantages of mosquito-based surveillance include the following: 
 1) It is labor-intensive and expensive. 
  
2) Substantial expertise is required for collecting, handling, sorting, species 
identification, processing, and testing. 
  
3) Collectors may be at risk from mosquito bites, especially if day biting 
species are important bridge vectors, and should wear topical repellents 
and/or repellent-treated clothing when working in areas where a risk of 
WNV transmission exists. 
 
 e) Minimal components of an entomological surveillance program 
 
A comprehensive mosquito surveillance program must include larval and 
adult sampling components, a mapping/record keeping component, a virus-
testing component, and a data analysis component.  To provide useful data, 
the surveillance program must be sustained and maintain a consistent effort 
over several seasons.  The exact design of mosquito-based surveillance 
programs will vary by geography and availability of financial and personnel 
resources.  Not every community will be able to support a comprehensive 
mosquito-based surveillance program.  Minimally, a mosquito-based WNV 
surveillance program must include the following: 
 
1)  Collection of adult mosquitoes using gravid traps and/or light traps, 
providing representative geographic coverage and with sufficient trap 
sites and trapping frequency to obtain sample sizes required to detect 
WNV at relatively low infection rates.  Use both fixed and flexible trap 
positions if possible. 
 
(a) Fixed positions allow for the development of a database that would let 
public health officials compare population data to previous years and 
spatially map changes in mosquito abundance.  
(b) Flexible sites allow for response to epidemiological and natural events 
(e.g., a suspected human case, dead crow, or a flood). 
(c) A variety of trapping methods should be used, including the following: 
 (i) CDC light traps baited with CO2 for sampling potential accessory 
vectors.  
 (ii) Gravid traps for Cx. pipiens and Cx. quinquefasciatus to sample 
primary WNV vectors. 
 
         (d) Trap distribution will be influenced by the following species factors: 
  (i) Habitat diversity, size, and abundance; 
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  (ii) Resource availability; 
  (iii) Proximity to human population centers and/or recreational areas; 
 and 
  (iv) Flight range of vector species in the area. 
 
2)   Laboratory support to identify the mosquitoes species, and to test the 
specimens for the presence of WNV. Determine infection rates by 
species. 
 
  (a) Make arrangements with a lab for testing.  Rapid turnaround is 
essential. 
  (b) Focus initially on Culex mosquitoes to provide first indication of WNV 
presence. 
 (c) Once virus is detected in Culex mosquitoes, pool and test all potential 
vector species with emphasis on incriminated or suspected species.  
 
(3)  Data management and analysis capabilities to allow tracking of adult 
mosquito densities and infection rates over time and space.  Patterns of 
virus activity are more likely to be useful than predetermined threshold 
levels. 
 
(4)  Development of a plan with descriptions of actions that will be taken in 
response to indicators of WNV activity. 
   
B. Surveillance for Human Cases 
 
Because the primary public health objective of surveillance systems for neurotropic 
arboviruses is prevention of human infections and disease, human case surveillance 
alone should not be used for the detection of arbovirus activity, except in jurisdictions 
where arbovirus activity is rare, or resources to support avian-based and/or mosquito-
based arbovirus surveillance are unavailable. 
 
GOALS OF SURVEILLANCE FOR HUMAN CASES:  To 1) assess the local, state and 
national public health impact of WNV disease and monitor national trends; 2) 
demonstrate the need for public health intervention programs; 3) allocate resources; 4) 
identify risk factors for infection and determine high-risk populations; 5) identify 
geographic areas in need of targeted interventions; and 6) identify geographic areas in 
which it may be appropriate to conduct analytic studies of important public health issues. 
 
1.  Recent Experience 
 
a) In the U.S. during 1999-2002, the peak human risk for WN viral infection 
occurred in August and September, although in 2002 human illness onset was 
reported as early as mid-May and as late as mid-December.  In many regions, 
the peak minimum infection rates in mosquitoes and a rapid increase in the 
number of reported avian and equine WN viral infections occurred just prior to 
the period of maximal human risk. 
 
b) In 1999-2002, the majority of reported, confirmed, or probable cases of human 
WN viral disease were among persons with meningoencephalitis.  Testing of 
patients with aseptic meningitis or unexplained febrile illnesses for evidence of 
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WN viral infection may be beneficial, but can also overwhelm laboratory testing 
capacity and appears to be of relatively low yield for surveillance purposes since 
the majority of these cases will not be due to WNV infection. 
 
c) Most patients with WN encephalitis or meningitis (WNME) are older adults, 
generally over 50 years old.  In the U.S. in 1999-2001, the median age among 
the 142 reported WNME cases was 68 years.  In 2002, among 2,942 reported 
cases of WN meningoencephalitis, the median age was 59 years.  Although 21% 
of reported cases were in persons younger than 40, only 4% of reported cases 
were in persons younger than 18. 
 
d) When WN viral infections were first identified in the U.S., WN encephalitis was 
associated with a Guillain-Barrè-like syndrome with generalized muscle 
weakness.  In 1999-2000, generalized muscle weakness was reported in 29% of 
WN encephalitis cases. In 2002, at least 2 new neurologic syndromes associated 
with WN viral infection were identified: acute flaccid paralysis (WN poliomyelitis-
like syndrome) and brachial plexopathy. 
 
e) Using CDC-recommended test methods in public health laboratories, WNV-
specific IgM antibody was detected in acute-phase (i.e., those collected 8 or less 
days after illness onset) serum or CSF specimens, or both, in the large majority 
of confirmed cases.  In contrast, only a small minority of suspected cases were 
subsequently confirmed in which specific IgM antibody reactivity in acute-phase 
serum or CSF was in the equivocal or low-positive range. 
 
f) Longitudinal studies of WNME cases have shown that WNV-specific IgM 
antibody can persist in serum for 12 months or longer.43 Thus, the presence of 
WNV-specific IgM antibody in a single serum sample is not necessarily 
diagnostic of acute WN viral infection. For this reason, especially in areas where 
WNV is known to have circulated previously, suspected, acute WN viral disease 
cases should be confirmed by observing a fourfold or more change in titer of 
WNV-specific antibody in serum and the presence of WNV-specific IgM antibody 
in CSF, when available. 
 
g) In 1999 in the U.S., the sensitivity of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests of 
CSF for the diagnosis of human WN encephalitis cases was only 57%; more 
recent statistics are currently unavailable. Thus, PCR for the diagnosis of WN 
viral infections of the human central nervous system (CNS) continues to be 
experimental and should not replace tests for the detection of WNV-specific 
antibody in CSF and serum, tests that are far more sensitive. 
 
h) During 1999-2001, 7 cases of uncomplicated WN fever (WNF) were reported in 
the U.S., which represents 5% of the total number of WNV disease cases 
reported. In 2002, over 1,100 WNF cases were reported (30% of total). 
Contributing factors likely include the intensive media attention paid to the 2002 
epidemic that may have led to increased consumer demand for WNV diagnostic 
testing by patients and physicians, and the greater availability of commercial 
testing. Nevertheless, during 1999-2002, WNF was probably significantly 
 
 19
underdiagnosed in the U.S. It has been estimated that approximately 20 WNF 
cases occur for every WNME case.44 
 
i) For suspected WNV disease cases in immunocompromised patients, WNV-
specific antibody may not be present. Since longer viremias may be observed in 
these patients, testing serum and CSF samples for the presence of virus or viral 
RNA may be useful. 
 
 
2. Types of Surveillance 
 
     a)  Clinical syndromes to monitor 
 
Monitoring of encephalitis cases is the highest priority. Monitoring milder 
illnesses (e.g., aseptic meningitis, Guillain-Barré syndrome, acute flaccid 
paralysis, and brachial plexopathy, and fever or rash illnesses) is resource-
dependent and should be of lower priority. 
 
     b)  Types of human surveillance 
1) Enhanced passive surveillance 
 
In the absence of known WNV activity in an area, enhanced passive 
surveillance* for hospitalized cases of encephalitis (and milder clinical 
syndromes as resources allow**), and for patients who have IgM antibodies 
to either WN or SLE virus in tests conducted in diagnostic or reference 
laboratories, should be employed.  A high clinical suspicion for arboviral 
encephalitis should be encouraged among health care providers. When the 
diagnosis is in doubt, appropriate clinical specimens should be submitted to 
CDC or another laboratory capable of performing reliable serologic testing for 
antibodies to domestic arboviruses.  Testing of CSF and paired acute- and 
convalescent-phase serum samples should be strongly encouraged to 
maximize the accuracy of serologic results. 
 
      2) Active surveillance 
 
Active surveillance should be strongly considered in areas with known WNV 
activity. In general, one or both of the following approaches should be taken: 
(a) Contact physicians in appropriate specialties (i.e., infectious diseases, 
neurology, and critical care) and hospital infection control personnel on a 
regular basis to inquire about patients with potential arboviral infections; 
(b) Implement laboratory-based surveillance to identify CSF specimens 
                                                 
*Passive surveillance enhanced by general alerts to key health care personnel such as primary care 




** While human infections with neurotropic arboviruses are usually clinically inapparent, most clinically 
apparent infections are associated with fever, with or without neurologic manifestations, which can range from mild 
aseptic meningitis to fulminant and fatal encephalitis.  Signs and symptoms may include fever, headache, stiff neck, 
confusion or other mental status changes, nausea, vomiting, meningismus, cranial nerve abnormalities, paresis or 
paralysis, sensory deficits, altered reflexes, abnormal movements, convulsions, and coma of varying severity.  
Arboviral meningitis or encephalitis cannot reliably be clinically distinguished from other central nervous system 
infections.  
meeting sensitive but nonspecific criteria for arboviral infections (e.g., mild to 
moderate pleocytosis and negative tests for the presence of nonarboviral 
agents such as bacteria, fungi, herpesviruses, and enteroviruses) and test 
them for evidence of WNV infection. 
 
      3) Special surveillance projects 
 
Special projects may be used to enhance arboviral disease surveillance. 
Such projects include the Emerging Infections Network of the Infectious 
Diseases Society of America (IDSA EIN), Emergency Department Sentinel 
Network for Emerging Infections (EMERGEncy ID NET), Unexplained Deaths 
and Critical Illnesses Surveillance of the Emerging Infections Programs (EIP), 
and the Global Emerging Infections Sentinel Network of the International 
Society of Travel Medicine (GeoSentinel).  In some areas, syndromic 
surveillance systems may be considered.  Piggy-backing surveillance for 
WNME and milder clinical forms of WN viral infection, such as fever with rash 
or lymphadenopathy, onto existing syndromic surveillance systems, 
especially those involving large health maintenance organizations, may be 
considered. Real-time computerized syndromic surveillance in emergency 
departments, and special surveillance projects to identify WNV disease in 
pediatric populations, may be useful. 
 
  3.  Specimens 
     a)  Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) 
In WNME cases, WNV-specific IgM antibody commonly can be found in CSF on 
the day of illness onset using antibody-capture ELISA. Virus also may be isolated 
(rarely) or detected by RT-PCR (in up to 60% of cases) in acute-phase CSF 
samples. 
b)  Serum 
Paired acute-phase (collected 0-8 days after onset of illness) and convalescent-
phase (collected 14-21 days after the acute specimen) serum specimens are 
useful for demonstration of seroconversion to WNV and other arboviruses by 
ELISA or neutralization tests. Although tests of a single acute-phase serum 
specimen may provide evidence of a recent WNV infection, a negative acute-
phase specimen is inadequate for ruling out such an infection, underscoring the 
importance of collecting paired samples. As mentioned previously, antibody 
synthesis in immunocompromised individuals might be delayed or absent 
altogether. 
     c)  Tissues 
When arboviral encephalitis is suspected in a patient who undergoes a brain 
biopsy or who dies, tissues (especially brain samples, including samples of 
cortex, midbrain, and brainstem), heart/venous blood, and buffy coat samples 
should be submitted to CDC or other specialized laboratories for arbovirus and 
other testing. Tissue specimens should be divided; half should be frozen at -70°C 
and the other half fixed in formalin.  Available studies include gross pathology, 






    4.  Surveillance Case Definition 
The national case definition for arboviral encephalitis (available at 
www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/casedef/encephalitiscurrent.htm) should be used to classify 
cases as confirmed or probable, once appropriate laboratory results are available 
(also see Section II). In CDC publications of national arbovirus surveillance data, no 
distinction is usually made between confirmed and probable human cases for the 
purposes of case counting. 
 
5. Minimal Components of a Human Surveillance System 
Enhanced passive surveillance for hospitalized encephalitis cases of unknown 
etiology, and for patients who have IgM antibodies to either WN or SLE virus in tests 
conducted in diagnostic or reference laboratories. 
 
C. Geography and Timing 
 
In general, the WNV transmission season in the U.S. is longer than that for other 
domestic arboviruses and requires longer periods of ecologic and human 
surveillance.  
 
1. Northeastern and Midwestern U.S. 
In the northeastern states in 2001-2002, human illness onset occurred as early as 
early July and as late as mid-November. During these same years, avian cases 
occurred as early as the first week of April and as late as the second week of 
December.  Active ecological surveillance and enhanced passive surveillance for 
human cases should begin in early spring and continue through the fall until 
mosquito activity ceases because of cold weather.  Surveillance in urban and 
suburban areas should be emphasized. 
2. Southern U.S. 
In 2001-2002, WNV circulated throughout the year, especially in the Gulf states.  
Although, in 2001-2002, human illness onset was reported as early as mid-May and 
June and as late as mid-December, equine and avian infections were reported in all 
months of the year.  Active ecologic surveillance and enhanced passive surveillance 
for human cases should be conducted year round in these areas.  
3. Western U.S. 
In 2002, WNV activity was first reported among humans and animals in Rocky 
Mountain states and among animals in Pacific coast states.  These events occurred 
relatively late in the year (mid-August).  Predicting the temporal characteristics of 
future WNV transmission seasons based on these limited reports is not possible. 
Despite this limitation, active ecological surveillance and enhanced passive 
surveillance for human cases beginning in early spring and continuing through the 
fall until mosquito activity ceases because of cold weather should be encouraged. 
4. Other Areas of the Western Hemisphere 
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In 2002, Canada experienced a WNV epidemic in Ontario and Quebec provinces 
and an equine/avian epizootic that extended from the maritime provinces to 
Saskatchewan. 
 
Recent serologic evidence supports the conclusion that WNV has now reached 
Central America.  Further spread to South America by migratory birds seems 
inevitable, if this has not already occurred.  Development of surveillance systems 
capable of detecting WNV activity should be encouraged in the Caribbean and 
Central and South America.  WNV surveillance should be integrated with dengue 
surveillance in these areas, and with yellow fever surveillance in areas where urban 




II. LABORATORY DIAGNOSIS 
The clinical presentation of most patients with viral encephalitis is similar regardless of the 
cause. Also, infection by many of the arboviruses that cause encephalitis, including West 
Nile and St. Louis encephalitis viruses, usually is clinically inapparent, or causes a 
nonspecific viral syndrome in most patients.  Definitive diagnosis, therefore, can only be 
made by laboratory testing using specific reagents.  To be successful, active surveillance 
must have adequate laboratory support. 
 
The basic laboratory diagnostic testsand how they should be used at the national, state, 
and local levelare outlined below.  The initial designation of reference and regional 
laboratories that can do all testing will be based on the availability of biosafety level 3 
(BSL3) containment facilities.  Details of the surveillance case definition for human West 
Nile virus (WNV) disease and of how the laboratory diagnostic tests are used to support 
surveillance are presented in Appendix B. 
A.  Biocontainment 
1.   Laboratory Safety Issues 
Laboratory-associated infections with WNV have been reported in the literature.  The 
Subcommittee on Arbovirus Laboratory Safety (SALS) in 1980, reported 15 human 
infections from laboratory accidents.  One of these infections was attributed to 
aerosol exposure.  Recently, two parenteral inoculations have been reported during 
work with animals.   
a)   WNV may be present in blood, serum, tissues and CSF of infected humans, 
birds, mammals and reptiles.  The virus has been found in the oral fluids and 
feces of birds.  Parenteral inoculation with contaminated materials poses the 
greatest hazard; contact exposure of broken skin is a possible risk. Sharps 
precautions should be strictly adhered to when handling potentially infectious 
materials.  Workers performing necropsies on infected animals may be at high 
risk of infection.  
b)   Biosafety Level 2 practices and facilities are recommended for activities for 
human diagnostic specimens.  In some cases it may be advisable to perform 
initial processing of clinical samples in a biosafety cabinet, particularly if high 
levels of virus is suspected (such as tissues from fatal human cases).  Biosafety 
Level 2 is recommended for processing field collected mosquito pools.  Biosafety 
Level 3 and Animal Biosafety Level 3 practices, containment equipment, and 
facilities are recommended, respectively, for all manipulations of West Nile 
cultures and for experimental animal and vector studies. Containment 
specifications are available in the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention/National Institutes of Health publication Biosafety in Microbiological 
and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL).45 This document can be found online at 
both http://bmbl.od.nih.gov/ and 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/bmbl4toc.htm.    
 





2. Shipping of Agents 
Shipping and transport of WNV and clinical specimens should follow current 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) and Department of Commerce 
recommendations.  Because of the threat to the domestic animal population, a U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) shipping permit is required for transport of known 
WNV isolates.  For more information, visit the IATA dangerous goods Web site at     
http://www.iata.org/cargo/dg/, and the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS), National Center for Import /Exports Web site at 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ncie/. 
 
B. Serologic Laboratory Diagnosis 
Accurate interpretation of serologic findings requires knowledge of the specimen.  For 
human specimens the following data must accompany specimens submitted for serology 
before testing can proceed or results can be properly interpreted and reported:  1) 
symptom onset date (when known);  2) date of sample collection;  3) unusual 
immunological status of patient (e.g., immunosuppression);  4) state and county of 
residence; 5) travel history in flavivirus-endemic areas;  6) history of prior vaccination 
against flavivirus disease (e.g., yellow fever, Japanese encephalitis, or Central European 
encephalitis); and  7) brief clinical summary including clinical diagnosis (e.g., 




a) Commercial kits for human serologic diagnosis of WNV infection are currently in 
development.  Until these kits are available, the CDC-defined IgM and IgG ELISA 
should be the front-line tests for serum and CSF.46-48 These ELISA tests are the 
most sensitive screening assays available.  The HI and indirect 
immunofluorescent antibody (IFA) test may also be used to screen samples for 
flavivirus antibodies.  Laboratories performing HI assays need be aware that the 
recombinant WNV antigens produced to date are not useful in the HI test; mouse 
brain source antigen (available from CDC) must be used in HI tests.  The 
recombinant WNV antigen is available from commercial sources.   
 
b) To date, the prototype WNV strains Eg101 or NY99 strains have performed 
equally well as antigens in diagnostic tests for WNV in North America. 
 
c) To maintain Clinical Laboratory Improvements Amendments (CLIA) certification, 
CLIA recommendations for positive and negative ranges should be followed, and 
laboratories doing WNV testing should participate in a proficiency testing 
program through experienced reference laboratories; CDCs Division of Vector-
Borne Infectious Diseases in Fort Collins, Colorado and the National Veterinary 




d) Because the ELISA can cross-react between flaviviruses (e.g., SLE, dengue, 
yellow fever, WN), it should be viewed as a screening test only.  Initial 
serologically positive samples should be confirmed by neutralization test.  
Specimens submitted for arboviral serology should also be tested against other 
arboviruses known to be active or be present in the given area (e.g., test against 
SLE, WN and EEE viruses in Florida). 
2. Animal 
 
a) In general, the procedures for animal serology should follow those used with 
humans cited above. 
 
b) Plaque-reduction neutralization test (PRNT) and HI assays, although technically 
more demanding, may be useful because they are species independent.   
 
C. Virologic Laboratory Diagnosis  
Experience gained in WNV diagnostic testing over the past 4 years has led to the 
following recommendations: 
 
1. Virus Isolation 
 
a) Virus isolation attempts should be performed in known susceptible mammalian or 
mosquito cell lines.  Mosquito origin cells may not show cytopathic effect and 
should be screened by immunofluorescence.   
 
b) Appropriate samples for virus isolation are prioritized as follows:  
 
1)  Clinically ill humans - CSF (serum samples may be useful early in infection)  
 
2)  Human (biopsy or postmortem) - brain tissue  
 
3)  Horses (postmortem) - brain tissue (including brainstem), spinal cord tissue 
 
4)  Birds - kidney, brain, heart 
 
5)  Other mammals - multiple tissues, especially kidney and brain 
 
c) Confirmation of virus isolate identity can by accomplished by indirect 
immunofluorescence assay (IFA) using virus-specific monoclonal antibodies, 
nucleic acid detection, or virus neutralization.  
 
d)  The IFA using well-defined murine monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) is the most 
efficient, economical, and rapid method to identify flaviviruses.  MAbs are 
available that can differentiate WNV and SLE virus from each other and from 
other flaviviruses.  Flavivirus-grouping MAbs are available for use as positive 
controls, and MAbs specific for other arboviruses can be used as negative 
controls.  In addition, incorporating MAbs specific for other arboviruses known to 
circulate in various regions will increase the rapid diagnostic capacities of state 
and local laboratories.  These reagents are available and should be used. 
 
e)  Nucleic acid detection methods including RT-PCR, TaqMan and nucleic acid 
sequence based amplification (NASBA) methods may be used to confirm virus 
isolates as WNV.   
 
f)  Virus neutralization assays also may be used to differentiate viruses, by using 
fourfold or greater titer differences as the diagnostic criterion in paired specimens 




2. Virus Detection in Tissues 
 
a) Antigenic analysis 
  
1) Immunohistochemistry (IHC) using virus-specific MAbs on brain tissue 
has been very useful in identifying both human and avian cases of WNV 
infection. In suspected fatal cases, IHC should be performed on formalin-
fixed autopsy, biopsy, and necropsy material, ideally collected from 
multiple anatomic regions of the brain, including the brainstem, midbrain, 
and cortex.24, 49 
 
2) Well-characterized antigen-capture ELISAs are now available for 
detection of SLE50,51 and WNV antigen in mosquito pools and avian 
tissues.25  
 
b) Nucleic acid analysis 
A number of nucleic acid detection methods have recently been employed for 
WNV diagnostic and surveillance purposes. An independent antigen or nucleic 
acid test is required to confirm detection of WNV nucleic acid with any of these 
methods. 
 
1) RT-PCR of tissues, mosquito pools, and CSF has proven to be a useful 
surveillance tool. RT-nested PCR has detected WNV nucleic acid in 
equine brain and spinal cord tissues. Standardized protocols developed 
by reference laboratories should be disseminated, and primer design 
information should be included so that other laboratories can prepare 
primers. A proficiency testing program should be developed by the 
reference laboratories so that these tests can be CLIA-certified in local 
laboratories. 
 
2) Fluorogenic 5' nuclease techniques (real-time PCR) and nucleic acid 
sequence-based amplification (NASBA) methods have been developed 
and have undergone initial validation in specific diagnostic 
applications.24,52-54 
 
D. Training and Infrastructure 
 
1. State and Local Arbovirus Laboratories  
Greater numbers of capable state and local laboratories performing screening 
assays (such as ELISA) should be developed to reduce time demands on reference 
laboratories. Reference laboratories should be utilized to confirm results of state and 
local laboratories, particularly for the initial identification of WNV in new locations and 
in new hosts.  
2. Training Programs  
Laboratory training programs have been developed and implemented at the federal 





III. PREVENTION AND CONTROL 
 
Prevention and control of arboviral diseases is accomplished most effectively through a 
comprehensive, integrated mosquito management program using sound integrated pest 
management (IPM) principles.55  IPM is based on an understanding of the underlying biology 
of the transmission system, and utilizes regular monitoring to determine if and when 
interventions are needed to keep pest numbers below levels at which intolerable levels of 
damage, annoyance, or disease occur. IPM-based systems employ a variety of physical, 
mechanical, cultural, biological and educational measures, singly or in appropriate 
combination, to attain the desired pest population control.   
 
Programs consistent with best practices and community needs should be established at the 
local level and, at a minimum, should be capable of performing surveillance sensitive 
enough to detect West Nile Virus (WNV) enzootic/epizootic transmission that has been 
associated with increased risk of disease in humans or domestic animals. Integrated 
mosquito management programs designed to minimize risk of WNV transmission and 
prevent infections of humans and domestic animals should optimally include the following 
components (modified from information provided by the American Mosquito Control 
Association, the New Jersey Mosquito Control Association, and the Florida Coordinating 
Council on Mosquito Control)56-58 
 
A. Surveillance 
 Effective mosquito control begins with a sustained, consistent surveillance program that 
targets pest and vector species, identifies and maps their immature habitats by season, 
and documents the need for control. Records should be kept on the species composition 
of mosquito populations prior to enacting control of any kind and to allow programs to 
determine the effectiveness of control operations.  All components of the integrated 
management program must be monitored for efficacy using best practices and standard 
indices of effectiveness. The following is a list of surveillance methodologies used by 
mosquito control agencies. 
 
1. Larval Mosquito Surveillance 
Larval surveillance involves sampling a wide range of aquatic habitats for the 
presence of pest and vector species during their developmental stages. Most 
established programs have a team of trained inspectors to collect larval specimens 
on a regular basis from known larval habitats, and to perform systematic surveillance 
for new sources. A mosquito identification specialist normally identifies the larvaes 
species. Properly trained mosquito identification specialists can separate nuisance 
and vector mosquito species. Responsible control programs target vector and 
nuisance populations for control and avoid managing habitats that support benign 
species.  
 
2. Adult Mosquito Surveillance 
Adult mosquito surveillance is used to monitor species presence and relative 
abundance of adult mosquitoes in an area.  Information derived from adult mosquito 
surveillance programs using standardized and consistent surveillance efforts provide 
information essential to monitoring potential vector activity, setting action thresholds, 
and evaluating control efforts.  Various methods are available for this purpose and 
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have been demonstrated to be effective in collecting a variety of mosquito species.59 
 The New Jersey light trap, CDCs miniature light trap, and other modifications of this 
design, with or without carbon dioxide bait, have been used extensively for collecting 
host-seeking adult mosquitoes.60  Gravid traps frequently are used to monitor the 
ovipositing segment of Cx. pipiens and Cx. restuans populations.  These species 
have been incriminated as the primary enzootic vectors of WNV in the northeastern 
states.61,62   Host-seeking Cx. tarsalis, a species that has been strongly associated 
with WNV transmission in areas where this species is common, are readily collected 
in CO2-baited CDC miniature light traps.  Resting boxes frequently are used to 
measure populations of Culiseta melanura, a bird-feeding mosquito that is important 
in the amplification of eastern equine encephalitis (EEE) virus.  Pigeon-baited traps 
may be employed to measure host-seeking Culex mosquitoes that amplify St. Louis 
encephalitis (SLE) and West Nile viruses.  Day-active mosquitoes like Ae. albopictus 
are difficult to collect, and obtaining a sample representative of the local populations 
requires extra effort.  Where these species are important, sample sizes may be 
enhanced by using CO2-baited CDC miniature light traps during daylight hours or by 
using alternative trap configurations that may be more effective in collecting these 
species (e.g., Fay trap or traps using a counterflow geometry).  Trap deployment 
should carefully address species habitat requirements on several spatial scales.   
 
3. Virus Surveillance 
The purpose of this component of the vector management program is to determine 
the prevalence of WNV in the mosquito population.  This is often expressed simply 
as the number of WNV-positive mosquito pools of a given species collected at a 
defined location and time period.  While the number of positive pools provides 
valuable information, it does not provide an index of virus prevalence in the vector 
population.  Preferably, the proportion of the mosquito population carrying the virus 
should be expressed as the infection rate (IR, expressed as the estimated number of 
infected individual mosquitoes per 1,000 specimens tested).  This is a more useful 
index of virus prevalence. The IR can be calculated by dividing the number of 
positive pools by the total number of specimens tested for that species and collection 
period, and multiplying the proportion by 1,000.  This assumes that a positive pool 
contains only one infected mosquito, which is a valid assumption in most 
circumstances.  When infection rates are high or sample sizes are low, a more 
accurate estimate of IR may be obtained by using a maximum likelihood estimate of 
the infection rate  see www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/software.htm.  Elevated 
infection rates, particularly if sustained over several weeks or in populations of 
opportunistic blood-feeders that may act as bridge vectors, are indicators of 
increased WNV transmission risk.  Specimens collected in the routine adult mosquito 
surveillance program plus special collections from key areas identified by other 
surveillance indicators (e.g., dead birds, sentinel flocks) can be used for this 
purpose.  Mosquito collections made at permanent study sites in a sustained 
program provide important baseline data to which new surveillance data are 
compared and decisions about human risk and need for emergency interventions are 
made.  
 
B. Source Reduction 
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Source reduction is the alteration or elimination of mosquito larval habitat breeding.  This 
remains the most effective and economical method of providing long-term mosquito 
control in many habitats.  Source reduction can include activities as simple as the proper 
disposal of used tires and the cleaning of rain gutters, bird baths and unused swimming 
pools by individual property owners, to extensive regional water management projects 
conducted by mosquito control agencies on state and/or federal lands.  All of these 
activities eliminate or substantially reduce mosquito breeding habitats and the need for 
repeated applications of insecticides in the affected habitat.  Source reduction activities 
can be separated into the following two general categories: 
 
1. Sanitation 
The by-products of humans activities have been a major contributor to the creation 
of mosquito breeding habitats. An item as small as a bottle cap or as large as the 
foundation of a demolished building can serve as a mosquito breeding area. 
Sanitation, such as tire removal, stream restoration, catch-basin cleaning and 
container removal, is a major part of all integrated vector management programs.  
Mosquito control agencies in many jurisdictions have statutory powers that allow for 
due process and summary abatement of mosquito-related public health nuisances 
created on both public and private property. The sanitation problems most often 
resolved by agency inspectors are problems of neglect, oversight, or lack of 
information on the part of property owners. Educational information about the 
importance of sanitation in the form of videos, slide shows, and fact sheets 




2. Water Management 
Water management for mosquito control is a form of source reduction that is 
conducted in fresh and saltwater breeding habitats. Water management programs 
for vector control generally take two forms, described below. Water management 
through impoundment and open water management have been very effective in the 
past.  Recently, restrictions on modification of aquatic habitats have limited the 
implementation of these practices, and in many areas, water management for vector 
control is no longer routinely employed and may be impractical in many settings. In 
these situations, alternative methods of mosquito management must be employed. 
 
a) Impoundment Management 
Impoundments are mosquito-producing marshes around which dikes are 
constructed, thereby allowing water to stand or to be pumped onto the marsh 
surface from the adjacent estuary. This eliminates mosquito oviposition sites on 
the impounded marsh and effectively reduces their populations. Rotational 
Impoundment Management (RIM) is the technique developed to minimally flood 
the marsh during the summer months and then use flapgated culverts to 
reintegrate impoundments to the estuary for the remainder of the year, thereby 
allowing the marsh to provide many of its natural functions. Although 
impoundments usually achieve adequate control of salt-marsh mosquitoes, there 
are situations in which impoundments can collect stormwater or rainwater and 
create freshwater mosquito problems that must be addressed using other 
techniques. 
 
b) Open Marsh Water Management (OMWM) 
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 Ditching as a source-reduction mosquito control technique has been used for 
many years. Open marsh water management is a technique whereby mosquito-
producing locations on the marsh surface are connected to deep-water habitat 
(e.g., tidal creeks, deep ditches) with shallow ditches. Mosquito broods are 
controlled without pesticide use by allowing larvivorous fish access to 
mosquito-producing depressions. Conversely, the draining of these locations 
occurs before adult mosquitoes can emerge. OMWM can also include 
establishing or improving a hydrological connection between the marsh and 
estuary, providing natural resource enhancement as well as mosquito control 
benefits. The use of shallow ditching (ditches approximately 3 feet or less in 
depth rather than the deep ditching used in years past) is considered more 
environmentally acceptable because than deep ditching because fewer unnatural 
hydrological impacts occur to the marsh.  
 
c)  Management in Stormwater Retention Structures 
Source reduction and water management practices may also be applied to 
stormwater retention structures designed to hold runoff before it is discharged 
into groundwater or surface water.  Mosquito control should be considered in the 
design, construction, and maintenance of these structures, as appropriate.  
Stormwater retention structures should be designed in consultation with experts 
in mosquito biology and control to prevent as much mosquito production as 
possible, and to facilitate proper functioning and maintenance in the future.  
Regulations associated with stormwater retention and flood control structures 
should incorporate appropriate operations and maintenance provisions including 
considerations for routine monitoring and control of mosquito populations. 
 
 
C. Chemical Control 
Insecticides can be directed against either the immature or adult stage of the mosquito 
life cycle when source reduction and water management are not feasible or have failed 
because of unavoidable or unanticipated problems, or when surveillance indicates the 
presence of infected adult mosquitoes that pose a health risk. 63  Chemicals used by 
mosquito control agencies must comply with state and federal requirements.  Public 
health pesticide applicators and operators in most states are required to be licensed or 





Larviciding, the application of chemicals to kill mosquito larvae or pupae by ground 
or aerial treatments, is typically more effective and target-specific than adulticiding, 
but less permanent than source reduction.  An effective larviciding program is an 
important part of an integrated mosquito control operation. The objective of 
larviciding is to control the immature stages at the breeding habitat before adult 
populations have had a chance to disperse and to maintain populations at levels at 
which the risk of arbovirus transmission is minimal.  Larvicides can be applied from 
the ground or by aerial application if large or inaccessible areas must be treated.  
Several materials in various formulations are labeled for mosquito larviciding 
including the organophosphate temephos (Abate); several biological larvicides such 
as Bacillus thuringiensis israelensis (Bti, a bacterial larvicide), Bacillus sphaericus;  
methoprene, an insect growth regulator (e.g., Altosid,); several larvicidal oils (e.g., 
petroleum-based Golden Bear and mineral-based Bonide) and monomolecular 
surface films (e.g., Agnique, Arosurf); and in some limited habitats diflubenzuron 
(e.g., Dimilin, a chitin synthesis inhibitor).  Applications of larvicides often encompass 
fewer acres than adulticides because treatments are made to relatively small areas 
where larvae are concentrated, as opposed to larger regions where adults have 
dispersed.  When applying larvicides, it is important that the material be specific for 
mosquitoes, minimize impacts on non-target organisms, and, where appropriate, be 
capable of penetrating dense vegetation canopies.  Larvicide formulations (i.e., 
liquid, granular, solid) must be appropriate to the habitat being treated, accurately 
applied, and based on surveillance data.  Accuracy of application is important 
because missing even a relatively small area can cause the emergence of a large 
mosquito brood resulting in the need for broad-scale adulticiding. 
 
2. Adulticiding 
Adulticiding is the application of pesticides to kill adult mosquitoes. The ability to 
control adult mosquitoes is an important component of any integrated mosquito 
management program, and like the other components of the program, its use should 
be based on surveillance data. Mosquito adulticiding may be the only practical 
control technique available in situations where surveillance data indicate that is 
necessary to reduce the density of adult mosquito populations quickly to lower the 
risk of WNV transmission to humans.  In some situations, source reduction and 
larvicide applications are not practical, and adulticide application is the only available 
control strategy. Mosquito adulticides typically are applied as an Ultra-Low-Volume 
(ULV) spray where small amounts of insecticide are dispersed either by 
truck-mounted equipment or from fixed-wing or rotary aircraft.64-68 Thermal fog 
applications of adulticides by ground or air are also used in some areas, but to a 
much lesser degree. Barrier treatments, typically applied as high volume liquids with 
hand-held spray equipment using compounds with residual characteristics, are 
common in some U.S. locations.  This technique is especially attractive to individual 
homeowners living near mosquito-producing habitats where residual chemicals 
applied along property boundaries can provide some control benefits. Mosquito 
adulticiding differs fundamentally from techniques used to control many other adult 
insects. For adult mosquito control, insecticide must drift through the habitat in which 
mosquitoes are flying in order to provide optimal control benefits. The EPA has 
determined that the insecticides labeled nationally for this type of application do not 
pose unreasonable health risks to humans, wildlife, or the environment when used 
according to the label.56  Adulticides labeled for mosquito control include several 
organophosphates such as malathion and naled. Some natural pyrethrins and 
synthetic pyrethroids (permethrin, resmethrin and sumithrin) also hold adulticide 
labels. Insecticide selection and timing of application should be based on the 
distribution and behavior of the target mosquito species. Application of adulticides 
should be timed to coincide with the activity period of the target mosquito species. 
Many Culex species are nocturnal and are active in the tree canopy level. This 
should be taken into consideration when planning adulticide applications. 
Operational experience indicates that Cx. pipiens and Cx. quinquefasciatus may 
require more frequent adulticide application to achieve desired levels of population 
reduction during an outbreak. Control of adult day-active species poses additional 
problems because ULV adulticide effectiveness is greatly reduced during daylight 
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hours. Early-morning use of adulticides, applied before temperatures rise, may 
provide a measure of control for these species. 
 
D. Resistance Management 
In order to delay or prevent the development of insecticide resistance in vector 
populations, integrated vector management programs should include a resistance 
management component (modified from Florida Coordinating Council on Mosquito 
Control, 1998).57  Ideally, this should include annual monitoring of the status of 
resistance in the target populations to:  
 
1. Provide baseline data for program planning and pesticide selection before the start 
of control operations. 
 
2. Detect resistance at an early stage so that timely management can be implemented 
(even detection of resistance at a late stage can be important in elucidating why 
disease control may fail); however, in such cases, management options other than 
replacement of the pesticide may not be possible). 
 
3. Continuously monitor the effect of control strategies on resistance.  In addition to 
monitoring resistance in the vector population, the integrated program should include 
options for managing resistance that are appropriate for the local conditions.69-70  The 
techniques regularly used include the following: 
 
a) Management by Moderation - preventing onset of resistance by  
1) Using dosages no lower than the lowest label rate to avoid genetic selection. 
2) Using less frequent applications. 
3) Using chemicals of short environmental persistence. 
4)  Avoiding slow-release formulations. 
5)  Avoiding the use of the same class of insecticide to control both adults and 
immature stages. 
6)  Applying locally.  Currently, most districts treat only hot spots. Area-wide 
treatments are used only during public health alerts or outbreaks. 
7)  Leaving certain generations, population segments, or areas untreated. 
8) Establishing high pest mosquito densities or action thresholds prior to 
insecticide application. 
9) Alternation of biorational larvicides and insect growth regulators annually or 
at longer intervals. 
 
b) Management by continued suppression - a strategy used in areas of high-value 
(e.g., heavily touristed areas) or where arthropod vectors of disease must be kept 
at very low densities. 
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This does not mean saturation of the environment by pesticides, but rather the 
saturation of the defense mechanisms of the insect by insecticide dosages that 
can overcome resistance. This is achieved by the application of dosages within 
label rates but sufficiently high to be lethal to susceptible as well as to 
heterozygous-resistant individuals. If the heterozygous individuals are killed, 
resistance (which is a homozygous trait) will be slow to emerge. This method 
should not be used if any significant portion of the population in question is 
resistant. Another approach more commonly used is the addition of synergists 
that inhibit existing detoxification enzymes and thus eliminate the competitive 
advantage of these individuals. Commonly, the synergist of choice in mosquito 
control is piperonyl butoxide (PBO). 
 
c) Management by multiple attack - achieving control through the action of several 
different and independent pressures such that selection for any one of them 
would be below that required for the development of resistance.  
This strategy involves the use of insecticides with different modes of action in 
mixtures or in rotations.  There are economic problems (e.g., costs of switching 
chemicals or having storage space for them) associated with this approach, and 
critical variables in addition to mode of action must be taken into consideration 
(i.e., mode of resistance inheritance, frequency of mutations, population 
dynamics of the target species, availability of refuges, and migration).  General 
recommendations are to evaluate resistance patterns at least annually and the 
need for rotating insecticides at annual or longer intervals.   
 
E.  Biological Control 
Biological control is the use of biological organisms, or their by-products, to control 
pests. Biocontrol is popular in theory, because of its potential to be host-specific and 
virtually without non-target effects. Overall, larvivorous fish are the most extensively 
used biocontrol agent for mosquitoes. Predaceous fish, typically Gambusia or other 
species which occur naturally in many aquatic habitats, can be placed in permanent or 
semipermanent water bodies where mosquito larvae occur, providing some measure of 
control. Other biocontrol agents that have been tested for mosquito control, but that to 
date generally are not widely used, include the predaceous mosquito Toxorhynchites, 
predacious copepods, the parasitic nematode Romanomermis, and the fungus 
Lagenidium giganteum. Biocontrol certainly holds the possibility of becoming a more 
important tool and playing a larger role in mosquito control in the future, but will likely be 
effective only as part of an integrated approach. 
 
F. Continuing Education of Mosquito Control Workers 
Continuing education is directed toward operational workers to instill or refresh 
knowledge related to practical mosquito control.  Training is primarily in safety, applied 
technology, and requirements for the regulated certification program mandated by most 
states. 
 
G.  Vector Management in Public Health Emergencies 
A surveillance program adequate to monitor WNV activity levels associated with human 
risk must be in place.  Detection of epizootic transmission of enzootic arboviruses 
typically precedes detection of human cases by several days to 2 weeks or longer (e.g., 
as found in SLE epidemics).71,72  If adequate surveillance is in place, the lead time 
between detecting significant levels of epizootic transmission and occurrence of human 
cases can be increased, which will allow for more effective intervention practices.19,27,31   
Early-season detection of enzootic or epizootic WNV activity appears to be correlated 
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with increased risk of human cases later in the season.  Control activity should be 
intensified in response to evidence of virus transmission, as deemed necessary by the 
local health departments.  Such programs should consist of public education 
emphasizing personal protection and residential source reduction; municipal larval 
control to prevent repopulation of the area with competent vectors; adult mosquito 
control to decrease the density of infected, adult mosquitoes in the area; and continued 
surveillance to monitor virus activity and efficacy of control measures.    
 
As evidence of sustained or intensified virus transmission in an area increases, 
emergency response should be implemented.  This is particularly important in areas 
where vector surveillance indicates that infection rates in Culex mosquitoes are 
increasing, or that potential accessory vectors (e.g., mammalophilic species) are 
infected with WNV.  Delaying adulticide applications in such areas until human cases 
occur is illogical and negates the value and purpose of the surveillance system.   
 
H.  Adult Mosquito Control Recommendations 
Ground-based (truck-mounted) application of adult mosquito control agents has several 
positive attributes. Where road access is adequate, such as in urban and suburban 
residential areas, good coverage may be achieved.  In addition, ground-based 
application can be done throughout the night, thereby targeting night-active mosquito 
species.  Such applications are prone to skips and patchy coverage in areas where road 
coverage is not adequate or in which the habitat contains significant barriers to spray 
dispersal and penetration. 
 
Aerial application is capable of covering larger areas in shorter time periods than a 
ground-based application.  This is a critical positive attribute when large residential 
areas must be treated quickly.  In addition, aerial application is less prone to patchy 
coverage than ground-based application in areas where road coverage is not adequate. 
 One limitation of aerial application is that many applicators will not fly at night, 
potentially reducing the effectiveness of the applications in Culex species control efforts. 
 Cost benefits of aerial application over ground application may not be realized unless 
relatively large areas are treated. 
 
Several formulations of a variety of active ingredients are available for adulticide 
applications.  Material choice for ground-based or aerially applied mosquito control in 
public health emergency situations is limited by EPA restrictions on the pesticide label 
and applicable state and local regulations. 
 
Multiple applications will likely be required to appreciably reduce Culex populations and 
interrupt arbovirus transmission.  An emergency SLE virus response plan developed for 
New Orleans, Louisiana63 indicates the need for repeated applications to control Cx. 
quinquefasciatus, and the need to repeatedly apply adulticides in high-risk areas (areas 
with human cases or positive surveillance events).  Two to three adulticide applications 
spaced 3-4 days apart may be required to significantly reduce Cx. pipiens populations. 
Effective surveillance must be maintained to determine if and when re-treatment is 
required to maintain suppression of the vector populations. 
 
Urban/suburban population centers with multiple positive surveillance events as 
described above should be treated first to most efficiently protect the largest number of 
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people from exposure to WNV.  Applications should be timed to coincide with the peak 
activity periods of the target species.  For example, applications should be made at night 
to maximize control of night-active Culex species.  Other species such as Oc. sollicitans 
or Ae. vexans are active shortly after sunset and are effectively controlled with 
appropriately timed applications.  Day-active potential accessory vectors (e.g., Oc. 
japonicus, Oc. triseriatus, Ae. albopictus) must be addressed separately and are most 
effectively controlled by residential source reduction efforts, though there is preliminary 
evidence that early morning ULV applications may be used to control these species. 
 
I.  Determining the Scope of Mosquito Adulticiding Operations 
Once arbovirus activity is detected in a jurisdiction and a decision is made to implement 
or intensify mosquito control by using adulticides, the size of the area to be treated must 
be determined.  In the broadest context, the underlying program objective (i.e., 
interruption of the enzootic transmission cycle vs. prevention of transmission to humans 
and domestic animals) should determine the amount of adulticide coverage that is 
required.  For most jurisdictions the objective is the prevention of transmission to 
humans and domestic animals.  There is no simple formula for determining how large an 
area to treat around a positive surveillance indicator or a suspected or confirmed human 
case of WNV.  Nor is there adequate information to guide decisions about the degree of 
vector population suppression that must be attained, or for how long this suppression 
must be maintained to reduce human disease risk.  At a minimum, the following factors 
must be considered when deciding the scope of the adulticiding effort: 
 
1.   The general ecology of the area, e.g., key habitat types and the presence of natural 
barriers such as large rivers; 
2.   The population density, distribution, flight range, and age structure (proportion of 
parous females) of the target mosquito species; 
3.   The flight range of the avian amplifying host(s); 
4.   The length of time since birds started dying or became infected in the affected area 
(typically, there may be a lag of several weeks between recovery of dead birds and 
confirmation of WNV infection) or since virus-positive mosquito pools were collected; 
5.   The human population characteristics  spatial distribution and density relative to the 
positive locality (e.g., urban vs. rural), age demographics; 
6.   Evidence of persistent WNV activity detected by the surveillance program; and 
7.   Season of the year and how long WNV activity can be expected to persist until the 
epizootic/epidemic vector(s) enter diapause. 
 
Several of these factors will be unknown or poorly understood.  Technical assistance 
from a mosquito control professional, particularly one experienced in mosquito 
control in the region, is crucial in this process.  Practical experience in conducting 
mosquito control is required to refine control recommendations.  For example, the 
size of an area selected for control applications may be reduced in response to 
structures like open areas, bodies of water, major highways, or other barriers that 
may restrict the distribution of targeted species.  Alternatively, adulticide coverage 
may be expanded to cover large urban or suburban residential neighborhoods with 




Hypothetically, in some settings where focal early season enzootic WNV activity has 
been detected, early season adulticiding may be useful in interrupting virus 
transmission and lead to lower transmission rates later in the season.  However, 
effective larval control of the principal enzootic mosquito vector is probably a more 
cost-effective way to interrupt early-season virus amplification. 
 
J.  Evaluation of Adult Mosquito Control 
The following parameters should be periodically monitored during control operations: 
 
1.  Minimum requirements: 
 
a) Pre- and post spray vector mosquito densities inside and outside control area 
using CO2-baited traps and gravid traps;     
b) Vector mosquito infection rates pre- and post-spray inside and outside the control 
area; and 
c) Weather conditions during application (temperature, wind speed, direction). 
 
2.   Desirable additions if capacity exists: population age structure of key mosquito 
species (Cx. pipiens) 
 
3. In addition, both droplet size and flow rate should be documented for each piece of 
ULV application equipment: 
 
4.   During aerial application, GPS monitoring of spray track should be conducted if 
equipment is available on aircraft. 
 
K. Health Education, Public Information, and Human Behavior Change  
The goals of health education, public information, and behavior change programs are to 
inform the public about WNV, promote the adoption of preventive behaviors that reduce 
disease risk, and gain public support for control measures. Health education/public 
information includes use of print materials (posters, brochures, fact sheets), electronic 
information (Web sites), presentations (health experts or peers speaking to community 
groups), and the media.  
 
Information alone is seldom sufficient to encourage people to adopt new behaviors or to 
change old practices. Programs should include strategies to facilitate protective actions 
and to address barriers that hinder preventive actions.  Examples of programs that go 
beyond information include developing a community task force, interventions to improve 
access to window screening materials or repellents, and social marketing to reinforce 
preventive behaviors.  
 
The following section covers key prevention messages, selected best practices, and 
research/program development priorities for promotion of personal and community 
measures to decrease risk of WNV infection.  Public education and risk communication 
activities must be ramped up to respond to the degree of WNV risk in a community, as 
noted in Table 1. 
            1.   Key WNV Prevention Messages 
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      a)   Address the multiple levels at which prevention can occur: personal protection 
(use of repellent on skin and clothing, use of protective clothing, awareness of 
prime mosquito-biting hours); household protection (eliminating mosquito 
breeding sites, repairing/installing screens); and community protection (reporting 
dead birds, advocating for organized mosquito abatement, participating in 
community mobilization). 
b)   Use of DEET-based repellents on skin and clothing is the backbone of personal 
protection.  (For current recommendations, see 
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/qa/insect_repellent.htm.)  Permethrin-based 
repellents should be promoted for use on clothing. 
c)   Emphasize the feasibility of actions that can lower an individuals WNV risk 
through personal protection measures.  Messages should acknowledge the 
seriousness of the disease but should not be fear-driven.  Fear-driven messages 
may heighten the powerlessness many people express in dealing with emerging 
diseases. 
d)   Recommendations to avoid being outdoors from dusk to dawn may conflict with 
neighborhood social patterns or practices of persons without air-conditioning or 
without other health programs seeking to increase physical activity.  An 
alternative is to emphasize that the hours from dusk until dawn are prime 
mosquito-biting hours, and that protecting oneself through repellent use during 
these hours is important, with the option of remaining indoors. 
e)   Communication about adulticiding: Public acceptance of emergency adult 
mosquito control is critical to its success, especially where mosquito control is 
unfamiliar or unpopular.  Questions about the products being used, their safety, 
and their effects on the environment are common.  Improved communication 
about surveillance and how decisions to adulticide are made may help residents 
weigh the risks and benefits of control.  When possible, provide detailed 
information regarding the schedule for adulticiding through newspapers, radio, 
the Internet, or a recorded phone message 
f)    Keep messages clear and consistent with the recommendations of coordinating 
agencies.  Use plain language whenever possible, and adapt materials for lower-
literacy and non-English speaking audiences. 
            2.   Selected Best Practices 
a)   Targeted prevention 
Audience members have different disease-related concerns and motivations for 
action.  Proper message targeting permits better use of limited communication 
and prevention resources.  The following are some audience groups that require 
specific targeting: 
 
1)   Persons over age 50:  While persons of any age can be infected with WNV, 
US surveillance data indicate that persons over age 50 are at higher risk for 
severe disease and death due to WNV infection. 
Collaborate with organizations that have an established relationship with 
mature adults, such as the AARP, senior centers, or programs for adult 
learners.  Include images of older adults in your promotional material.  
Identify activities in your area where older adults may be exposed to 
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mosquito bites (e.g. jogging, golf, gardening). 
 
2)   Persons with outdoor exposure:  While conclusive data are lacking, it is 
reasonable to infer that persons engaged in extensive outdoor work or 
recreational activities are at greater risk of being bitten by WNV-infected 
mosquitoes.  Develop opportunities to inform people engaged in outdoor 
activities about WNV.  Encourage use of repellent and protective clothing, 
particularly if outdoors during evening, night, or early morning hours.  Local 
spokespersons (e.g., union officials, job-site supervisors, golf pros, gardening 
experts) may be useful collaborators. 
3)   Homeless persons:  Extensive outdoor exposure and limited financial 
resources in this group present special challenges.  Application of repellents 
with DEET or permethrin to clothing may be most appropriate for this 
population.  Work with social service groups in your area to reach this 
population segment. 
4)   Persons who live in residences lacking window screens:  The absence of 
intact window/door screens is a likely risk factor for exposure to mosquito 
bites.  Focus attention on the need to repair screens and resources to do so. 
 Partner with community organizations that can assist elderly persons or 
others with financial or physical barriers to screen installation or repair. 
b)   Partnerships with media and the community 
Cultivate relationships with the media.  Obtain media training for at least one 
member of your staff, and designate that individual as the organizations 
spokesperson.  Develop clear press releases and an efficient system to answer 
press inquiries. 
 
Develop partnerships with agencies/organizations that have relationships with 
populations at higher risk (such as persons over 50) or are otherwise recognized 
as community leaders (e.g., churches, service groups).  Working through sources 
trusted by the target audience can heighten the credibility of and attention to 
messages.  Partnerships with businesses that sell materials to fix or install 
window screens or that sell insect repellent may be useful in some settings. 
c)   Community mobilization and community outreach 
Community mobilization can further education and behavior change goals.  To 
counter any idea that health departments/mosquito control programs are able to 
control WNV alone, develop community ownership for prevention activities.  A 
community task force that includes civic, business, health, and environmental 
concerns can be valuable in achieving buy-in from various segments of society 
and in developing a common message.  Community mobilization activities can 




Community outreach involves presenting messages in person, in addition to 
media and educational materials, and incorporating citizens in prevention 
activities.  Hearing the message of personal prevention from community leaders 
can validate the importance of the disease.  Health promotion events reinforce 
the importance of prevention in a community setting. 
3.   Research and Program Development Priorities 
a)   Audience research 
Attitudes toward arboviral disease prevention vary considerably by region.  
Previous experience with nuisance mosquitoes and mosquito control will affect 
the acceptability of prevention efforts.  Audience research can identify local 
attitudes, motivations, barriers to prevention, and opportunities to promote 
desired behaviors. 
 
Audience research should ideally combine qualitative and quantitative efforts.  
Surveys assessing knowledge, attitude, and practice levels in the target 
population can be very helpful, especially in evaluation, though they are a 
substantial undertaking.  Qualitative research techniques, such as interviews and 
focus groups, can yield valuable data, and are more adaptable to resource 
levels. Expertise to undertake such efforts may be available from other divisions 
within a health department (e.g., chronic disease programs, maternal and child 
health). 
 
Pretesting of educational materials is an important step to ensure the usability of 
materials by the intended audience. Pretesting does not always have to involve 
considerable time or expense; simply having representatives of the intended 
audience review materials before printing will be useful. 
b)   Evaluation 
Outcome evaluation should be conducted whenever possible to measure the 
efficacy of the intervention in achieving protective behaviors (e.g., frequency of 
repellent use, presence of household mosquito breeding sites).  Outcome 
measurement requires extensive effort and must be planned from the outset of a 
program. 
c)   Social marketing and risk communication 
The goal of social marketing is to achieve specific behaviors, using the concepts 
of product, price, place, and promotion.  Use of social marketing approaches can 
help programs plan to achieve specific behavior change goals. 
 
Risk communication is already used by many health departments, and can be 
useful in refining communication messages for WNV, especially as the disease 
becomes endemic in new areas, and in discussing community control.  Risk 
communication can help people analyze the choices that are available to them 
and to their community. 
4.   Resources 
The CDC Web site (www.cdc.gov/westnile) is updated frequently to reflect new 
findings and recommendations.  Materials on the CDC Web site are generally in the 
public domain, and serve as a resource for state and local health departments and 
other organizations. 
 
CDC staff can provide technical assistance in the development of audience research 
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and strategies for public education and community outreach.  Contact CDC/Division 
of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases health communication staff at 970-221-6400.  
CDC can provide other communication planning resources, including CDCynergy 
(www.cdc.gov/cdcynergy/), an interactive CD-ROM designed to help systematically 
plan health communication programs. 
 
 
Other organizations that can provide useful information are the American Mosquito 
Control Association (www.mosquito.org/) and the National Pesticide Information 
Center (NPIC) (npic.orst.edu), a program of EPA and Oregon State University 
concerning pesticides and repellents.  They can be contacted at 1-800-858-7378. 
 
L.  Legislation 
In addition to statutes permitting legal action to abate mosquito-related public health 
nuisances, legislation must be in place to allow creation of and provide funding for 
municipally-based integrated mosquito management programs.  Local jurisdictions can 
contact state mosquito control associations to provide examples of enabling legislation.   
 
M. Guidelines for a Phased Response to WNV Surveillance Data 
The principal goal is to minimize the health impact of the WNV in humans, as well as in 
domestic and zoo animals.  Given the limited understanding of the ecology and 
epidemiology of WNV in the U.S., the low incidence of arboviral encephalitis, and the 
limitations of prevention methods, prevention and control measures, regardless of 
intensity, may not prevent all WNV infections in humans.   
 
The recommended response levels for the prevention and control of WNV should 
augment, but not replace, long-standing mosquito control efforts by established 
programs.  These programs often have two objectives: 1) to control nuisance 
mosquitoes, and 2) to control vector mosquitoes that can transmit pathogenics.  
Nuisance mosquito control often has different objectives than vector control, and the 
target mosquito species may also differ.  Established mosquito control programs often 
have long-standing experience with the surveillance and control of indigenous 
neurotropic arboviruses such as SLE virus.  These programs have established 
thresholds for response based on historical data.  Long-standing experience with WNV 
does not exist in the U.S.  
 
These guidelines for the prevention and control of WNV should be interpreted according 
to the following considerations: 
 
1. All states should prepare for WNV activity.  Given the extensive geographic spread 
of WNV since 1999, its occurrence in many different habitats and ecosystems in the 
Old World, its expansion into numerous habitat types in the Western Hemisphere, 
and the fact that SLE virus, a related flavivirus, is widespread in the U.S., there 
appear to be no barriers to the spread of WNV throughout the U. S.  At a minimum, a 
plan for the surveillance, prevention, and control of WNV should be developed at the 




2. Measures of the intensity of WNV epizootic in an area should be considered when 
determining the level of the public health response.  Accumulating data analyses 
indicate that intensity of epizootic WNV activity as measured by avian mortality and 
mosquito infection rates are good indicators of subsequently increased human 
infection risk.   Data from NYC indicate that human WNV disease cases were more 
likely to occur in counties that had experienced more than 0.1 dead crow reports per 
square mile per week.  In the Staten Island outbreak of 2000, the density exceeded 
1.5 dead crow reports per square mile per week.  Also, analysis of 2001 and 2002 
surveillance data indicate that counties reporting WNV-infected dead birds early in 
the transmission season are more likely to report subsequent WNV disease cases in 
humans than are counties that do not report early WNV-infected dead birds. These 
observations should be interpreted as a guide rather than an absolute.  Levels of 
epizootic activity that correlate with increased human risk will vary by region. 
 
3. Flexibility is required when implementing the guidelines.  Knowledge gained from 
ongoing surveillance and research could change the phased response 
recommendations.  Specific and detailed recommendations that will fit all possible 
scenarios are not possible, particularly at a local level.  Therefore, public health 
action should depend on interpreting the best available surveillance data in an area, 
in light of these general guidelines.  In addition, the following factors should be 
considered when translating these guidelines into a plan of action: 
 
a) Current weather and predicted climate anomalies; 
b) Quality, availability, and timeliness of surveillance data; 
c) Feasibility of the planned prevention and control activities, given existing budgets 
and infrastructure; 
d) Public acceptance of the planned prevention and control strategies; 
e) Expected future duration of WNV transmission (surveillance events earlier in the 
transmission season will generally have greater significance); and 
f) Other ongoing mosquito control activities, such as nuisance mosquito control or 
vector mosquito control for the established arboviral encephalitis viruses. 
 
The recommended phased response to WNV surveillance data is shown in Table 1.   
Local and regional characteristics may alter the risk level at which specific actions must 
be taken.  
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  None 
 
Off-season; adult vectors inactive; 
climate unsuitable. 
 
Develop WNV response plan. Secure surveillance and 
control resources necessary to enable emergency 
response. Initiate community outreach and public 
education programs. Conduct audience research to 
develop/ target education & community involvement. 







Spring, summer, or fall; areas 
anticipating WNV epizootic based on 
previous WNV activity in the region; 
no current surveillance findings 
indicating WNV epizootic activity in 
the area. 
 
Response as in category 0, plus: conduct entomologic 
survey (inventory and map mosquito populations, monitor 
larval and adult mosquito density), Initiate source 
reduction; use larvicides at specific sources identified by 
entomologic survey and targeted at likely amplifying and 
bridge vector species; Maintain avian mortality, vector and 
virus surveillance; Expand community outreach and public 
education programs focused on risk potential and personal 
protection, and emphasizing residential  source reduction; 
Maintain surveillance (avian mortality, mosquito density 
/IR, human encephalitis/meningitis and equine illness). 






Summer, or fall; areas with limited or 
sporadic WNV epizootic activity in 
birds and/or mosquitoes. No positives 
prior to August.  
 
Response as in category 1, plus: increase larval control, 
source reduction, and public education emphasizing 
personal protection measures, particularly among the 
elderly. Enhance human surveillance and activities to 
further quantify epizootic activity (e.g., mosquito trapping 
and testing). Implement adulticide applications if vector 
populations exceed locally established threshold levels, 
emphasizing areas where surveillance indicates potential 







Spring, summer, or fall; areas with 
initial confirmation of epizootic WNV in 
birds before August; a horse and/or a 
human case, or sustained WNV 
activity in birds and/or mosquitoes.   
 
Response as in category 2, plus: intensify adult mosquito 
control in areas where surveillance indicates human risk,  
Initiate adult mosquito control if not already in progress, 
Initiate visible activities in community to increase attention 
to WNV transmission risk (speaker, social marketing 
efforts, community mobilization for source reduction, etc.), 








Spring, summer, or fall; quantitative 
measures indicating WNV epizootic 
activity at a level suggesting high risk 
of human infection (e.g., high dead 
bird densities In early summer, 
sustained high mosquito infection 
rates, multiple positive mosquito 
species, horse or mammal cases 
indicating escalating epizootic 
transmission, or a human case and 
high levels of epizootic activity).  
Areas with early season positive 
surveillance indicators where WN 
epidemic activity has occurred in the 
past. 
 
Response as in category 3, plus: Expand public 
information program to include TV, radio, and newspapers 
(use of repellents, personal protection, continued source 
reduction, risk communication about adult mosquito 
control), Increase visibility of public messages, engage key 
local partners (e.g., government officials, religious leaders) 
to speak about WNV ; intensify and expand active 
surveillance for human cases; intensify adult mosquito 
control program, repeating applications in areas of high 









Multiple confirmed cases in humans; 
Conditions favoring continued 
transmission to humans (e.g., 
persistent high infection rate in 
mosquitoes, continued avian mortality 
due to WNV) 
 
Response as in category 4, plus: Intensify emergency 
adult mosquito control program repeating applications as 
necessary to achieve adequate control. Enhance risk 
communication about adult mosquito control. Monitor 
efficacy of spraying on target mosquito populations.  If 
outbreak is widespread and covers multiple jurisdictions, 
consider a coordinated widespread aerial adulticide 
application; emphasize urgency of personal protection 
through community leaders and media, and emphasize 
use of repellent at visible public events. 
 





IV. HEALTH DEPARTMENT INFRASTRUCTURE 
State and Local Health Departments 
In the 48 contiguous United States, state and local health departments should have a 
functional arbovirus surveillance and response unit, staffed by well-trained personnel who 
have adequate data-processing resources, appropriate laboratory facilities, and an 
adequate operating budget.  The size and complexity of these units will vary by jurisdiction, 
depending on both the risk of arboviral transmission in the area and available resources.  A 
functional arbovirus surveillance unit at the state level should be considered an essential 
component of any emerging infectious diseases program.  Local health department 
expertise and capabilities should be supported in a manner that complements statewide 
programmatic goals. 
A.  Staffing and Personnel 
Ideally, arboviral surveillance involves epidemiologists, virologists, medical 
entomologists, vertebrate biologists, veterinarians, laboratory staff, environmental 
toxicologists, public affairs personnel, and data managers.  In a particular jurisdiction, 
the combination of personnel needed to conduct arboviral surveillance will depend on 
the importance of arboviral diseases in the area and on resources.  Many health 
departments experience a chronic shortage or complete absence of medical 
entomologists and expertise in wildlife pathobiology.  Addressing these deficiencies 
should be a high priority.  In the event of an arboviral disease outbreak, local health 
departments will likely require significant surge capacity to ensure an adequate public 
health response.  Contingency planning to identify resources to assist with the enhanced 
surveillance, laboratory, environmental, and public health needs should be identified 
ahead of time. 
B.  Training and Consultation 
Opportunities exist at federal and state agencies for appropriate training of and 
consultation with laboratorians, medical entomologists, epidemiologists, vertebrate 
biologists, and others involved in arbovirus surveillance. 
C.   Laboratory Capacity 
The infrastructure of arbovirus laboratories in the U.S. has deteriorated significantly in 
recent decades, not only in terms of the total number of functional laboratories and 
overall capacity, but also in terms of the staffing, physical plant, and financial support of 
many remaining laboratories.  This is a problem of national scope and significance, the 
solution for which will require leadership at all levels of government. 
1.  Testing for West Nile Virus (WNV) Infections 
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In the wake of the introduction of WNV into the Western Hemisphere, it is important 
to distinguish between increasing short-term and long-term laboratory capacity.  The 
latter is preferred and should be emphasized over the former.  Laboratories with an 
existing capability for arbovirus serology should consider adding serologic screening 
tests for WNV to their repertoire.  For serologic screening of patients and mosquito 
pools, arrangements can be made with CDC to transfer existing technology and 
reagents, and to obtain appropriate training.  Samples giving positive or equivocal 
screening results should be confirmed by CDC or another laboratory capable of 
definitive testing.  For selected laboratories, similar technology transfer 
arrangements can be made with regard to RT-PCR primers for use in the testing of 
tissues and mosquito pools.  In the wake of the recent epidemic of WN encephalitis 
in the Northeast, it is important that programs continue to routinely test for other 
arboviruses historically active in their area, such as St. Louis encephalitis, eastern 
equine encephalitis, western encephalitis, and La Crosse viruses, as well as for 
other causes of acute encephalitis. 
D.   Developing Local Public Health Agency Infrastructure 
The function of local public health agencies is assessment, assurance, and policy 
development to promote and protect the health of the public.  As part of this function, 
local public health agencies are responsible for preventive activities to reduce the risk of 
WNV infection to individuals in their jurisdictions.  This responsibility includes educating 
communities about reducing mosquito breeding sites and taking personal protective 
measures.  Local public health agencies also must have the capacity to assess human 
risk by gathering surveillance data or having access to surveillance data gathered on a 
district, regional, or statewide basis.  These local public health agencies are important to 
formulating local recommendations on the indications and decisions concerning 
mosquito adulticiding.  Education of and communication with the public, and 
maintenance of local media contacts are generally primary functions of the local public 
health agency.  Included in this responsibility is communicating risk regarding the use of 
pesticides. 
 
The following infrastructure and functional capacities fall within the province of local 
public health agencies.  Where these are not directly provided, access to these 
capacities is to be ensured). 
1.   Risk assessment based on surveillance data (including mosquito, bird, and human 
data).  Surveillance data may also include reports from individuals or healthcare 
providers indicating possible adverse health effects from pesticide use. 
2.   Health education regarding personal protection, reduction of mosquito breeding sites 
and minimum health risks posed by approved pesticides applied according to the 
label.73,74 
3.   Communication with the media. 
4.   Development of a preventive plan including education, mosquito source reduction, 
and larviciding. 
5.   Public response capability, particularly when surges of public inquiries arise. This 
may include the use of telephone hotlines and Internet Web sites. 
6.   Training of staff. 
7.   Coordination with state and federal agencies. 
8.   Local coordination by formulation of a task force with organizations such as 
departments of public works, offices of public affairs, city/county building 
management, departments of parks and recreation, departments of planning and 
zoning, property or building inspection services, police, public schools, colleges and 
 
 46 
universities, nonprofit and grassroots organizations, businesses, zoos, animal/vector 
control, local mosquito control districts, emergency medical services, hospitals, 
poison control centers, departments of game and inland fisheries, departments of 




V.  INTERJURISDICTIONAL DATA SHARING AND NATIONAL REPORTING OF 
HUMAN CASES 
 
The public and animal health response to West Nile virus (WNV) epidemics/epizootics 
involves all levels of government, including the federal governments of the U.S. and 
neighboring countries, and the Pan American Health Organization. In addition, multiple 
government agencies at each level are often involved.  Rapid, efficient, secure, and 
coordinated systems are needed to allow the sharing of human and ecologic data between 
these multiple agencies to support long-term surveillance activities, and to support activities 
that are part of the rapid outbreak response. 
 
During an epidemic involving multiple jurisdictions, CDC staff and other authorized persons 
will use Epi-X, a CDC-sponsored, Web-based system for secured electronic communication, 
or similar integrated communication systems, for rapid dissemination of information on 
public health events of public health significance. 
 
     A.   Human Epidemiological, Clinical, and Laboratory Data Collection 
Patient confidentiality statutes vary among jurisdictions.  Data can be shared between 
jurisdictions if recipients agree to adhere to the confidentiality statutes of the jurisdiction 
providing the data.  Electronic databases should be appropriately secured by passwords 
to limit access and minimize opportunities for breaches in confidentiality or security. 
 
    B.    National Reporting of Human WNV Disease Cases 
            
1.  National Reporting of Human Cases of West Nile Meningoencephalitis (WNME) 
WNME is included in the list of nationally notifiable diseases maintained by the 
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) in consultation with CDC. 
CDC has designated 10056 as a specific disease code (EVENT code) for use in 
reporting WNME cases via the National Electronic Telecommunications System for 
Surveillance (NETSS).  For national reporting purposes, states should use the 
national surveillance case definition of arboviral encephalitis/meningitis for classifying 
cases as either confirmed or probable (see Appendix C).  Until such time as ArboNET 
and NETSS are consolidated under the National Electronic Disease Surveillance 
System (NEDSS) standards, duplicate reporting of human cases of WNME to both 
ArboNET and NETSS will be encouraged. 
 
           2.  West Nile Fever (WNF) 
Although WNF is not included in the list of nationally notifiable diseases, states are 
encouraged to report WNF cases to CDC via ArboNET, using a CDC recommended 
case definition (see Appendix D).  States may also choose to report WNF cases to 
NETSS using EVENT code 10049. 
C.   Ecologic Data 
Many of the issues that apply to the interjurisdictional sharing of human data apply to the 
sharing of ecologic data as well, although key differences exist.  For example, 
confidentiality is generally not an issue with nonhuman cases, particularly wild animals 
identified as part of a surveillance program.  Maintaining confidentiality may be important 
for certain owned animals.  Data standardization is a far more challenging issue 
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because of the relatively large number of species being studied.  Specific needs include 
the following: 
 
           1.   Accurate Taxonomic Identification of Specimens 
Fully understanding the epidemiology and developing effective prevention and control 
strategies for WNV requires accurate identification of all animal species involved in 
the virus transmission and maintenance cycles.  This is especially true for birds and 
mosquitoes. 
          2.   Unique Identifier (UID) Numbering System for Specimens 
A UID numbering system should be used in each jurisdiction (e.g., state, county, city, 
surveillance area).  Such a system should distinguish readily between each major 
animal group reported (i.e., humans, birds, and mosquitoes), and encode the location 
of collection (county or town), date of collection (day/month/year), and a specimen-
specific number. 
          3.    Durable Tagging System for Field-Collected Specimens 
Use appropriate labels containing complete specimen information on all samples 
(blood, tissues, or whole animals) so field specimen identification will not be lost 





VI. RESEARCH PRIORITIES 
 
The human and animal health implications of the introduction of West Nile virus (WNV) to 
the U.S. and to the Western Hemisphere continue to emerge. Many questions remain, the 
answers to which will require considerable research. A research agenda should be 
supported, with priority given to research questions whose answers can be directly applied 
to prevention and control.  
 
A. Current and Future Geographic Distribution of WNV 
To determine the geographic distribution of WNV in the Western Hemisphere, existing 
laboratory-based surveillance systems for WNV in human, birds, other selected animals, 
and mosquitoes should be enhanced, or new, active systems should be developed and 
implemented (see Section I). 
B. Bird Migration as a Mechanism of WNV Dispersal                                                       
Experience in Europe and the Middle East suggests that WNV regularly is introduced to 
new geographic areas along bird migration routes.  A better understanding of this 
potential is required for the Western Hemisphere.  Studies should include the frequency 
and duration of chronic infections that will allow the long-range transport and 
recrudescence of viremias necessary to infect mosquitoes.         
C. Vector and Vertebrate Host Relationships and Range 
Relatively little is known about the vertebrate host and mosquito vector relationships of 
WNV in the U.S. and the Western Hemisphere.  Effective prevention and control 
strategies will require targeting selected species involved in maintenance, epidemic/ 
epizootic transmission cycles, or both.  It is critical that the principal species and the 
range of these species be determined. 
D. Virus Persistence Mechanisms 
It is not known whether or how WNV will be maintained in the U.S. over the long term. 
Overwintering mechanisms in Culex and Aedes species should be investigated, as well 
as persistence and maintenance of the virus in ticks.  Other possibilities that should be 
investigated include the duration of chronic infection and reactivation in birds or other 
animals, and the introduction of the virus by migratory birds. 
E. Mosquito Biology, Behavior, Vector Competence, Surveillance, and Control 
It is critical that a better understanding is gained of the principal mosquito vectors 
involved in maintenance, bridge (from enzootic to peridomestic), and epidemic/epizootic 
transmission.  Different vector species may be important in different geographic or 
ecologic regions.  Understanding their biology and behavior will allow for more effective 
surveillance and development of targeted control methods. 
F. Development and Evaluation of Prevention Strategies 
Effective prevention and control of WNV transmission will require evaluation of the 
efficacy of current control methods and research on new and innovative control 
strategies for the principal mosquito vectors.  Ultimately, prevention strategies must be 
integrated and use a variety of approaches to control mosquitoes and reduce the risk of 
transmission.  Research should also be conducted to better define target areas for 
mosquito control in response to documented WNV activity in an area. 
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A very long-term goal is the identification and implementation of new, natural 
compounds to repel and control mosquito vectors of disease.  With efforts to decertify 
current pesticides, new compounds will be needed in the fight against vector-borne 
diseases.    
Much effort has been expended to increase public awareness of the WNV threat and of 
the actions needed to reduce exposure to infected mosquitoes.  These actions include 
using mosquito repellents, reducing periresidential mosquito breeding sites, and wearing 
protective clothing when entering mosquito-infested areas.  The success of these public 
information campaigns has not been formally evaluated using scientific instruments such 
as knowledge and behavior surveys.  The cost of such campaigns is high, so formal 
attempts to assess their success are needed. 
G. Laboratory Diagnosis 
Surveillance for WNV will continue to require accurate laboratory diagnostic tests.  
Ideally, these tests will be simple and inexpensive, and will distinguish between WNV 
and other flaviviruses such as the SLE, dengue, and yellow fever viruses.  Virus-specific 
tests for IgM or IgG antibody will be required for humans, various species of birds, 
horses, and other mammals.  Sensitive viral detection methods will be required for both 
human and animal tissues as well as for mosquito pools.   
H.  Clinical Spectrum of Disease and Long-Term Prognosis in Humans  
A better understanding of the spectrum of illness caused by WNV infection in humans is 
needed, including the long-term consequences of acute infection of the central nervous 
system.  In addition to the severe end of the clinical spectrum (viral encephalitis), it is 
important to know the degree to which mild viral syndromes occur and whether these 
patients have any unique clinical presentations that may be characteristic or even 
pathognomonic.  It is also important to know whether they have viremia and, if so, its 
magnitude and duration.  Effective clinical management of severe disease will require 
detailed clinical studies of confirmed human cases of WNV infection.  
I. Risk Factor Studies 
Data on the risk factors associated with human and animal infection with WNV are 
required to develop more effective prevention strategies, particularly when educating the 
public to take specific prevention measures to reduce exposure to infection. 
J. Detailed Clinical Descriptions and Outcome in Human Cases 
Larger and more detailed case series, as well as studies of short- and long-term 
outcomes, are needed to better understand the clinical features, clinical course, and 
public health impact of WNV disease in humans.  A suggested framework for collecting 
standardized extended clinical variables is included in Appendix E. 
K.  Viral Pathogenesis 
Little is known of the pathogenesis of WNV in humans or other animals.  Research is 
needed to better understand the organ systems affected, the mechanism of central 
nervous system (CNS) infection, and the role of virus strain in pathogenesis. 
L.  Genetic Relationships and Molecular Basis of Virulence 
Only since 1996 has WNV been associated with significant numbers of severe disease 
cases and fatalities in humans.  It is important to better understand whether genetic 
changes in WN viruses influence their phenotypic expression (i.e., host and vector 
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range, clinical expression in various hosts, and epidemic potential).  This will require 
detailed studies of the genome of WN virus strains isolated from different epidemics in 
various geographic areas. 
M.  Vaccine Development for Animals and Humans 
Ultimately, the most effective prevention strategy may be vaccination.  It is important to 
support research on the development of both human and equine vaccines. 
N.  Antiviral Therapy for West Nile Virus and Other Flaviviruses 
To date, none of the available antiviral agents are effective against flaviviruses, including 
WNV.  Research in this area is critical to effective management of severe disease in 
humans.  
O.  The Economic Cost of the WNV Epidemic/Epizootic 
It is important to estimate the total economic cost of the epidemic/epizootic.  These data 
will help set priorities for capacity building and prevention programs.  
P. WNV Impact on Wildlife 
WNV has the potential to greatly impact the wildlife populations in the Western 
Hemisphere.  This is especially true for birds, in many of which the infection appears to 
have high mortality rates (i.e., Corvidae).   Research is needed to analyze and define 
this impact to determine if the development of new epizootic intervention strategies is 
needed.  Research is also needed to determine what long-term effects WNV infection 
may have on its animal hosts. 
Q.   Investigate Alternate Modes of WNV Transmission to Humans 
Four new modes of WNV transmission to humans were identified in 2002:  blood 
transfusion, tissue transplantation, transplacental transfer, and breast-feeding.  New 
modes of transmission should be investigated to determine the impact they have on 
human infection and to develop effective approaches for prevention and control of WNV 








The objectives of the national West Nile virus (WNV) surveillance system are to: 
 
• Monitor the geographic and temporal spread of WNV in the U.S. 
 
• Develop national public health strategies for WNV surveillance, prevention, and control. 
 
• Develop a more complete regional picture of the geographic distribution and incidence of the 
other clinically important arboviruses in the U.S. 
 
• Provide national and regional information to public health officials, elected government 
officials, and the public. 
 
• Evaluate the use of cooperative agreement funds and the need for additional resources. 
 
Scope:         
 
Coordinated, multi-state surveillance of WNV infections in humans and animals has been 
repeatedly identified as a high priority by states affected by WNV in 1999-2002.  All states 
conducting surveillance for WNV and other arboviruses are encouraged to participate in 
ArboNET, a CDC-coordinated program to collect these surveillance data.  While the 
components of WNV surveillance systems employed in individual jurisdictions will vary, national 
WNV surveillance should, at a minimum, focus on collection of data from: 
 
• Mosquito surveillance 
 
• Avian (dead bird) surveillance 
 
• Equine surveillance 
 
• Human surveillance  
 
In addition to data from states, data from commercial laboratories will be sought.  CDC will 1) 
formally notify all such laboratories of the need to report any positive laboratory results to the 
appropriate state or local health department who, in turn, will notify CDC; 2) provide them with a 
list of state health department contact persons; 3) periodically contact them to encourage 
reporting; and 4) remind them of the need to have all positive screening tests for arboviral 
infections confirmed by state public health laboratories.  In addition, CDC will provide a list of 
these commercial laboratories to its cooperative agreement partners, to facilitate their efforts to 
conduct active laboratory-based surveillance for arboviral infections. 
 
Categories of Data to be Collected: 
 




• Denominator data 
 
Definition: Weekly totals of dead birds (classified as either corvids or others) and mosquito 
pools (classified by species) collected and/or tested by a jurisdictions WNV surveillance 
system, stratified by county within a state. Because recent experience has demonstrated 
that the following categories of denominator data are of limited use in meeting national 
surveillance goals, as of 2003, CDC will discontinue the collection of totals of sentinel and 
free-ranging wild birds, horses, or other non-human mammals tested.  
 
• Numerator data 
 
Definition: Detailed information on individual mosquito pools, sentinel species, dead birds, 
and ill humans, horses, or other species with confirmed or suspected WNV infections, as 




Reporting denominator data: 
 
CDC will collect aggregate denominator data via a secure file upload system using a state-
based database provided by CDC, continuous data entry into a database stored on a secured 
CDC web site, or importation of delimited records in a specified format. Denominator data 
variables are specified in Table 1. An appropriate submission schedule will be arranged by CDC 
with the jurisdictions submitting surveillance data via file uploading.  In addition, 
 
• CDC will distribute the necessary software and provide the adequate licenses that will allow 
regular secured file upload or continuous web-based data entry. 
 
• CDC will accommodate state health departments with existing integrated data collection 
systems, e.g., by arranging for uploads of XML-formatted data.  
 
• The data entry screens will be designed as a series of simple forms or tables.  
 
• The system will accommodate updates and corrections of previously transmitted data by 
jurisdictions. 
 
• Following the entry of a weeks data into the database at the state level, transmission of the 
data file to CDC will involve a minimal number of keystrokes. Security will be insured by use 
of the senders digital certificate. CDC will arrange for those who will be transmitting 
surveillance data to CDC to obtain digital certificates. 
 
• Upon arrival at CDC, records from the specific reporting week of interest will automatically 
be captured and imported into a master database on the CDC fileserver and also 




• Using these data, reports will be generated automatically each week. Maps will be 
generated by CDC and USGS and made available on the USGS web site. A basic set of 
dynamic maps and corresponding graphs and tables will be made available weekly.  The 
CDC web site and Epi-X (or a similar secured communication network) will contain links to 
the relevant USGS web pages. 
 
Reporting numerator data: 
 
CDC strongly encourages prompt (real-time) reporting of numerator data.  CDC will collect 
such reports in a standardized manner to allow monitoring of regional and national trends, and 
facilitate prompt confirmatory testing when necessary.  As the arbovirus transmission season 
progresses, the need for immediate reporting of certain data to CDC may diminish.  For 
example, once numerous WNV-positive mosquito pools have been previously documented in a 
given geographic area, there may not be a compelling need to immediately report further 
findings.  In addition, if at any time the volume of reporting becomes overwhelming, adoption of 
an alternative system may be necessary. 
 
Numerator data variables that will be collected are specified in Table 2.  WNV laboratory and 
surveillance case criteria are specified in Table 3. 
 
Specified, line-listed numerator data may be submitted using one of three methods: 
 
• Web-based data entry to a CDC server; 
 
• Use of state-based, CDC-distributed, Microsoft Access-based data entry/management 
software (ArboNET) with continuous file upload to a CDC server; or  
 
• Data messaging from a unique data collection system to a CDC server (e.g., in XML format). 
 
All data entry will be done by the reporting jurisdiction and data is transmitted to a CDC server. 
After data entry and submission, numerator data will be available on the CDC Secure Data 
Network (SDN) so that authorized personnel from the reporting jurisdiction may verify 
(proofread, correct, and clear for publication) individual numerator data records in selected 
surveillance categories. 
 
It is essential that each numerator data record include a unique identifier (UID) assigned by the 
reporting state agency. UIDs will be used by CDC staff to track and update individual numerator 
data records, and by states to verify records via the CDC SDN.  The UID will not appear in 
output products for public release.  Most jurisdictions already have systems in place for 
generating UIDs, and they should continue to use them.  CDCs databases will accommodate 
numeric or alphanumeric UIDs up to 25 characters long.  Jurisdictions are encouraged to begin 
their UIDs with their states 2-letter postal code (or NYC for New York City).  
 
The issue of numerator data records associated with laboratory-probable results deserves 
special mention.  Although CDC encourages confirmation of all laboratory-probable results, it is 
realized that under some circumstances some states may choose not to do so, depending on 
the epidemiologic situation, laboratory capacity, and volume.  For example, during a known WN 
viral epizootic, a state may decide that a crow brain associated with a single positive result for 
WN viral RNA by RT-PCR will undergo no further testing. Although this bird is a laboratory-
probable case (see table below), the jurisdiction may decide to upload that birds numerator 
data record to CDC and subsequently authorize CDC to release it publicly.  In contrast, a 
jurisdiction may opt to delay the release of such results to the public until they have been 
laboratory-confirmed.  CDC will rely on individual jurisdictions to decide when to authorize the 




CDC will not publicize numerator data records associated with laboratory-equivocal results. 
 
In terms of human surveillance, the national surveillance case definition of arboviral 
encephalitis/meningitis includes two official case-status categories: confirmed and probable 
(Table 3). For national arboviral encephalitis surveillance, CDC has traditionally combined 
records in these two categories for its annual summary reports, and will continue this practice 
within the WNV surveillance system. States are encouraged to promptly report both laboratory-
confirmed and laboratory-probable human WN encephalitis cases as numerator data records. 
 
CDC encourages the reporting of human WN viral illnesses other than WNME (e.g., WNF, acute 
flaccid paralysis, other clinical syndrome, or unspecified). To determine case status (confirmed 
or probable) for reporting purposes, refer to the national surveillance case definition of arboviral 
encephalitis/meningitis (Appendix C) and the CDC-recommended surveillance case definition 
for WNF (Appendix D). A working case definition for WNME in equines is shown in Appendix B. 
 
Arboviruses other than WNV: 
 
It is anticipated that enhanced WNV surveillance will result in increased recognition of other 
domestic arboviral activity, including eastern equine encephalitis (EEE), western equine 
encephalitis (WEE), SLE, La Crosse (LAC), and Powassan (POW) virus activity.  Surveillance 
numerator (laboratory-positive) data regarding these viruses may be reported to CDC/DVBID 
via ArboNET, telephone, FAX, or e-mail. 
 




• State and local health authorities will retain control of the timing of data release. 
 
• As of 2003, reporting agencies will electronically report to ArboNET all categories of 
surveillance data, including human numerator data.  For non-human data, agencies will 
verify accuracy and readiness for public release prior to submission.  Upon the electronic 
submission of non-human data to CDC, these reports will be considered verified and 
publishable.  With the 2003 version of ArboNET, human data will be automatically verified 
upon entry, and the reporting agency has the option to unverify the data via electronic 
checkbox.  CDC will not publicly release unverified human case reports.  
  





• To report data via secure file upload to the CDC fileserver or to enter data directly onto a 
secured web site, states will utilize the CDC SDN, which provides data encryption for 
transmission via the Internet.  To use the SDN, users must obtain and install a digital 
certificate from the CDC certificate server. This allows for unique identification of the 




• To obtain a digital certificate and be approved to use the SDN, the digital certificate authority 
at CDC/DVBID must approve the request and forward it to CDC/Atlanta.  CDC requests that 
a maximum of 3 persons from each state be designated to receive digital certification.  
These should include those who will transmit data to CDC, as well as those who will verify 
data on the SDN. 
 
Summary Reports to be Produced by CDC and USGS:  
 
A working list of basic summary reports is shown in Table 4.  The exact list and formats of these 
reports remain to be determined, and this should be viewed as a dynamic process. 
Modifications, additions, and deletions may take place over time, as dictated by feedback, 
experience, technical issues, and events. 
 
Using state-approved numerator and denominator data, reports will be generated weekly.  Maps 
and tables will be generated by DVBID and by USGS.  Maps and corresponding graphs and 




• A dedicated telephone line (970-266-3592), electronic mailbox (dvbid2@cdc.gov), and fax 
machine (970-266-3599) will be available at CDC/DVBID (in Fort Collins, Colorado) 24 
hours/day for reporting numerator data or other urgent WNV-related business. During nights 
and weekends, calls to the dedicated phone line will be forwarded to the cellular phone of an 
on-call CDC/DVBID staff scientist.   Because of potential delays in the receipt and reading of 
email and fax messages, in general please use the telephone for time-sensitive business. 
 
• In addition to periodic conference calls between CDC, cooperating states, and other federal 
agencies, Epi-X and the WNV Information Exchange (WNVIX, part of the Epi-X Forum) will 
be available to participating jurisdictions and agencies using the CDC SDN. For further 
information, contact the CDC/DVBID ArboNET staff at 970.221.6400 or send electronic mail 
to dvbid2@cdc.gov. 
 
Submission of Laboratory Specimens to CDC for WNV Testing: 
 




Table 1.  Denominator Data Variable List 
 
(Note: As of 2003, denominator data will no longer be collected in the following categories: 
sentinel animals, seroprevalence in free-ranging birds, and ill equines or humans.)   
 
I. Avian mortality: (Includes ill or dead birds, except for sentinels.) 
 Year 
 MMWR week that bird collected (MMWR week collected) 
(Note: MMWR week collected corresponds to the earliest date associated with a 
specimen. Preferably, this should be MMWR week that corresponds to the date that 
the bird was reported by the public. But, if a date of report is not available, use the 
MMWR week that corresponds to the date that the specimen was collected in the 




 Number of reported corvids by MMWR week collected and by county (Data source: 
State, county or township WNV surveillance coordinators through the state to CDC) 
 Number of corvids tested by MMWR week collected and by county (Data source: 
Testing laboratories through state) 
 Number of other reported birds by MMWR week collected and by county (Data source: 
Jurisdictional WNV surveillance coordinators to CDC via state or municipal health 
departments)  
 Number of other birds tested by MMWR week collected and by county (Data source: 
Testing laboratories through state)    
 
Note: Laboratory-positive results are reported through the numerator system by the testing 
facility/agency. In this report, the date of reporting/sighting or field collection is routinely 
obtained.  By definition, each numerator data record of a WNV-positive dead bird should also be 
included within an aggregated denominator data record.)  
 
II. Mosquito collections: 
 
 Year 
 MMWR week of collection  
(Note: This is the MMWR week that corresponds to the date of field collection. This date 
should remain associated with this specimen throughout testing.) 
 County 
 State 
 Species of mosquito 
 Number of mosquitoes collected by MMWR week of collection, by county, and by 
species (Data source: Jurisdictional WNV surveillance coordinators to CDC via state or 
municipal health departments) 
 Number of mosquitoes tested by MMWR week of collection, by county, and by species 




(Note: Laboratory-positive results are reported through the numerator system by the testing 
facility/agency. In this report, the date of field collection is routinely obtained. By definition, each 
numerator data record of a WNV-positive mosquito pool should also be included within an 
aggregated denominator data record.) 
Table 2. Numerator data variables  
 
Mosquito surveillance  state, county, pool UID, date of mosquito collection, week of collection, 
species, arbovirus, case status  
 
Sentinel species surveillance - State, county, group UID, date of serum collection, week of serum 
collection, species, arbovirus, case status   
 
Avian mortality surveillance  state, county, bird UID, week bird found collected, date bird collected, 
species (including captive species), arbovirus, case status  
 
Avian seroprevalence surveillance  state, county, bird UID, week bird trapped & bled, date bird 
trapped & bled, species, arbovirus, case status 
 
Veterinary (non-avian) surveillance  state, county, animal UID,  week of illness onset, date of illness 
onset, species (canine, equine, feline, bat, squirrel, rabbit, raccoon, or other species), arbovirus, case 
status. 
 
Human surveillance  state, county, patient UID, week of illness onset, date of illness onset, imported 
from, arbovirus, case status, age, age unit, birthdate, sex, race, ethnicity, clinical syndrome, fatality, 
date of death, lab acquired, non-lab acquired, blood donor, blood recipient. organ donor, organ 






Table 3.  WNV Laboratory and Surveillance Case Criteria 
 















• WNV isolation (identity of virus established 
by at least two of the following techniques:  
• Positive RT-PCR test for WN viral RNA with 
validation by 1) repeated positive test using 
different primers, 2) positive PCR result 
using another system (e.g., TaqMan), or 3) 
virus isolation. 
• Detection of  WN viral antigen (e.g., IFA, 
EIA, VecTestTM) validated by inhibition test 
(for ELISA), RT-PCR, or virus isolation 
 
• Positive RT-PCR test for WN 
viral RNA in a single test 
• Antigen detection not 







Sentinel species  
 
• WNV isolation, RNA detection, or antigen 
detection as described for mosquitoes,  
• Seroconversion to WNV in serially collected 
serum specimens, by plaque-reduction 
neutralization** 
• Detection of IgM antibody to WNV, validated 
by demonstration of neutralizing antibody to 
WNV** 
 
• Detection of IgM antibody to 
WNV 
• Seroconversion to WNV in 
serially collected serum 
specimens, strongly reactive 





• WNV isolation, RNA detection, or antigen 





• Positive RT-PCR test for WN 
viral RNA in a single test 
• Antigen detection not 






   

















• See national surveillance case definitions 
(Appendices C and D) 
 
• See national surveillance case 
definitions  (Appendices C and 
D) 
 
*   CDC strongly encourages attempts to confirm all laboratory-probable and -equivocal results. Further testing of laboratory-probable human specimens will depend on availability of 
confirmatory testing. 
**   SLE virus infection should be ruled-out by cross-neutralization; criterion for PRNT positive is a 90% neutralization titer of at least 1:10, and 4-fold greater titer compared to other 
flaviviruses such as SLE.
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Table 4.  Working List of Basic Weekly Summary Reports to be Produced by CDC 
 
NOTE: The exact list and formats of these reports remain to be determined, and this should be 
viewed as a dynamic process. Modifications, additions, and deletions may occur over time, as 
dictated by feedback, experience, technical issues, and events. 
 
A. National map: U.S. map with state boundaries reflecting cumulative data. 
1.  Mosquito surveillance: 
   a.  Map showing each states counties as WNV-positive, WNV-negative, or blank 
(no data) 
2.  Sentinel chicken surveillance: 
  a.  Map showing each states counties as WNV-positive or blank (no data) 
3.  Avian morbidity/mortality surveillance: 
  a.  Map showing each states counties as WNV-positive, WNV-negative, or blank 
(no data)   
  4.  Veterinary (non-avian) surveillance: 
         a.  Map showing each states counties as WNV-positive (# cases) or blank (no 
data)  
  5.  Human surveillance: 
        a.  Map showing each states counties as WNV-positive (# cases) or blank (no 
data)  
 
B.  State Maps: Selecting an individual state from the national map will produce a map of that 
state with its county boundaries indicating the positive specimens reported for that county 
and an accompanying table of cumulative positive specimens reported by county. 
1.   Mosquito surveillance: 
      a.  Map showing each county as WNV-positive with a count of positive 
specimens reported, WNV-negative, or blank (no data) 
2.  Sentinel species surveillance: 
     a.   Map showing each county as WNV-positive with a count of positive 
specimens reported or blank (no data) by sentinel species (e.g., horse, 
chicken) 
3.  Avian mortality surveillance: 
 a.   Map showing each county as WNV-positive with a count of positive 
specimens reported, WNV-negative, or blank (no data)   
4.   Veterinary (non-avian) surveillance: 
     a.      Map showing each county as WNV-positive with a count of positive specimens 
reported or blank (no data)   
5.   Human surveillance: 
    a.    Map showing each county as WNV-positive with a count of positive 
specimens reported or blank (no data)   
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Table 5.   Instructions for Submitting Laboratory Specimens to CDC for WNV Testing 
 
Arrangements for Testing: 
 
Mosquito specimens: Specimens will be accepted for confirmatory testing at CDC when 
requested by a state health department vector surveillance coordinator.  For specimens 
considered by a state health department vector surveillance coordinator to be of high priority 
and beyond the capacity of the state public health laboratory or collaborating laboratory, initial 
and confirmatory testing can be obtained at CDC by special arrangement, depending on CDC 
laboratory capacity.  For further information, please contact Dr. Roger Nasci, tel. 970-221-6432, 
RNasci@cdc.gov; if Dr. Nasci cannot be reached, please phone 970-266-3592. 
 
Sentinel chicken specimens: Serum specimens will be accepted for confirmatory testing at CDC 
when requested by a state health department vector or vertebrate surveillance coordinator.  For 
specimens considered by a state health department vector or vertebrate surveillance 
coordinator to be of high priority and beyond the capacity of the state public health laboratory or 
collaborating laboratory, initial and confirmatory testing can be obtained at CDC by special 
arrangement, depending on CDC laboratory capacity.  For further information, please contact 
Dr. Rob Lanciotti, tel. 970-221-6440, RSLanciotti@cdc.gov; if Dr. Lanciotti cannot be reached, 
please call 970-266-3592. 
 
Avian morbidity/mortality specimens: On a case-by-case basis, special arrangements can by 
made for CDC to conduct initial and/or confirmatory tests of tissue specimens (especially brain, 
heart, kidney, and spleen) from dead birds that cannot otherwise be tested in state health 
department laboratories or by the National Wildlife Health Center, USGS.  For further 
information, please contact Dr. Nick Komar, tel. 970-221-6496, NKomar@cdc.gov; if Dr. Komar 
cannot be reached, please call 970-266-3592. 
 
Veterinary (non-avian) specimens: Specimens will be accepted for confirmatory testing at CDC 
when requested by a state health department laboratory director.  For routine testing of 
veterinary specimens, contact the state health department laboratory or the National Veterinary 
Services Laboratory, USDA, in Ames, IA (Tel. 515-663-7751), or another collaborating 
laboratory. For specimens considered by a state health department laboratory director to be of 
high priority and beyond the capacity of that states public health laboratory, initial and 
confirmatory testing can be obtained at CDC by special arrangement.  For further information, 
please contact Dr. Rob Lanciotti, tel. 970-221-6440, RSLanciotti@cdc.gov; if Dr. Lanciotti 
cannot be reached, please call 970-266-3592. 
 
Human specimens: Specimens will be accepted for confirmatory testing at CDC when 
requested by a state health department laboratory director.  For specimens considered by a 
state health department laboratory director to be of high priority and beyond the capacity of the 
state public health laboratory or collaborating laboratory, initial and confirmatory testing can be 
obtained at CDC by special arrangement.  For further information, please contact Dr. Rob 
Lanciotti, tel. 970-221-6440, RSLanciotti@cdc.gov; if Dr. Lanciotti cannot be reached, please 
call 970-266-3592. 
 
General Shipping Instructions: 
 





Specimens should be shipped by overnight courier to arrive at CDC on Tuesday-Friday. 
Always notify CDC staff in advance of an impending shipment (tel. 970-221-6445; if no 
answer, phone 970-266-3592).  Do not ship specimens on Friday unless special 
arrangements have been made. 
 
Shipping address:  CDC/DVBID 
CSU Foothills Campus/Rampart Road 
Fort Collins, CO 80521 
ATTENTION: Arbovirus Diagnostic Laboratory (tel. 970-221-6445) 
 
Shipping containers: Use only durable containers.  Seal specimen containers tightly.  Wrap 
specimen containers in absorbent material and pack them into two different plastic 
containers to insure that any leakage is contained.  Specimens for virus isolation must be 
sent on enough dry ice to insure that they remain frozen until receipt.  Specimens for 
serologic testing can be shipped on gel-ice and need not remain frozen.  Hand-carrying 
specimens is not recommended but if specimens are hand-carried, the above packing 
instructions are applicable. 
 
Minimal Information to Accompany Specimens Shipped to CDC:  
 
See information in columns 2, 3, and 4 in Table 2.  Please read carefully and supply all 
available information.  Use CDC Form 5034 (the ADASH@ form) Form 5034 is available 
electronically at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/CDC_form5034.pdf 
 
Tubes, cryovials, and other specimen containers should be clearly labeled with  at minimum  
the specimens UID, patients name (human), state, date of onset, date of collection, and 
specimen type. 
 
Special Collection, Shipping, and Handling Instructions: 
 
Mosquitoes:  Ship on dry ice. 
 
Serum:  Store in externally threaded plastic tubes.  Ship at least 0.5 mL per specimen. 
Whenever possible, acute and convalescent specimens should be shipped together.  Ship 
fresh-frozen on dry ice (required for virus isolation) or refrigerated on wet ice (acceptable). 
 
CSF:  Store in externally threaded plastic tubes.  Ship at least 1.0 mL per specimen. Ship fresh-
frozen on dry ice (required for virus isolation) or refrigerated on wet ice (acceptable). 
 
Whole blood:  In general, send only if requested for virus isolation attempts in fatal cases (heart 
 blood). 
 
Pregnancy-related specimens: In possible cases of intrauterine arboviral infection, tissues 
collected at the time of delivery can be tested for evidence of infection.  The following tissues 
should be shipped fresh-frozen on dry ice: cross-sections of umbilical cord, placental tissue 
(approximately 1 cm3 per sample), cord serum and maternal serum (0.5 ml each), and 
colostrum or breast milk. For more information, please contact Dr. Dan OLeary at (970) 266-




Autopsy specimens:  In suspected cases of arboviral encephalitis in which an autopsy is 
performed, fresh-frozen tissues can be tested, including brain (multiple areas of cortex, 
midbrain, brainstem, and spinal cord), other solid organs (liver, spleen, pancreas, heart, kidney, 
etc.), CSF (collected from ventricles), and heart blood (for virus isolation attempts).  
 
 
After consulting with Dr. Sherif Zaki or other CDC/Atlanta pathology staff members (tel. 404-
639-3133), tissue samples suspended in formalin should be sent to:  
 
Infectious Disease Pathology Activity 
DVRD/NCID/CDC 
Building 1, Room 2301 
1600 Clifton Road, N. E. 
Atlanta, GA 30333 
 
Veterinary (non-avian) tissues:  As for human specimens. 
 
Avian tissues: Submit fresh-frozen brain, heart, kidney, and spleen samples. 
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Appendix B B Surveillance Case Definition for WNV Infection in Equines 
 
Laboratory criteria for diagnosis  
Compatible clinical signs[1] plus one or more of the following: 
! Isolation of West Nile (WN) virus from or demonstration of specific viral antigen or 
genomic sequences in tissue, blood, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) or other body fluid;[2] 
or  
 
! Detection of IgM antibody against WN virus by IgM-capture ELISA in serum (at 1:400 
or greater dilution) or cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) (at dilution 1:2 or greater dilution); or 
 
! An associated 4-fold or greater change in IgG-capture ELISA or plaque-reduction 
neutralization test (PRNT) antibody titer to WN virus in appropriately timed,[3] paired 
serum specimens from an equid that is unvaccinated against WN virus; or 
 
! Positive immunohistochemistry (IHC) for WN virus antigen in tissue. 
 
Case classification  
 
Probable:  compatible clinical signs occurring during a period when arboviral transmission is 
likely, and with the following supportive serology:  1) a single or stable (less than or equal to 
two-fold change) but elevated titer of WN virus-specific IgM-capture ELISA or neutralizing serum 
antibodies without knowledge of prior WN virus vaccination.   
  




[1] Clinical signs are associated with central and/or peripheral nervous system dysfunction.  
Most horses exhibit secondary CNS-derived neurological manifestations such as ataxia 
(including stumbling, staggering, wobbly gait, or incoordination) or at least two of the 
following: circling, hind limb weakness, inability to stand, multiple limb paralysis, muscle 
fasciculation, proprioceptive deficits, altered mental status, blindness, lip 
droop/paralysis, teeth grinding. (Ostlund et al,  Equine West Nile Encephalitis, United 
States, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol 7, No 4.  Jul  Aug 2001) Fever is not a 
consistent finding.  
 
[2] Preferred diagnostic tissues from equids are brain or spinal cord; isolation of WN virus or 
detection of WN viral nucleic acid sequences in equine blood or CSF are infrequent. 
(Bunning et al,  Experimental Infection of Horses with West Nile virus, Vol 8, No. 4. April 
2002) 
 
[3] The first serum should be drawn as soon as possible after onset of clinical signs and the 
second drawn at least 14 days post-onset. 
_______________________________________________ 
Assumptions on which case definitions are based: 
• IgM-capture ELISA testing may give nonspecific results; cross-reactions to closely 
related flaviviruses (e.g., St. Louis encephalitis virus) may occur.  Because closely 
related arboviruses exhibit serologic cross-reactivity, positive results of serologic tests 
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using antigens from a single arbovirus can be misleading.  In some circumstances (e.g., 
in areas where two or more closely related arboviruses occur, or in imported arboviral 
disease cases), it may be epidemiologically important to attempt to pinpoint the infecting 
virus by conduction cross-neutralization tests using an appropriate battery of closely 
related viruses. 
• Vaccination refers to one or more doses of the current USDA-licensed inactivated WN 
virus vaccine. 
• IgM antibody in equine serum is relatively short-lived (how long);(ref?) a positive IgM-
capture ELISA means infection with WN virus or a closely related flavivirus has 
occurred, probably within the last three months. (personal communication Eileen N. 
Ostlund, USDA) 
• Neutralizing antibody, as detected by PRNT, may not be present in equine serum until 
two weeks or more after exposure to WN virus; it is possible that clinical signs may be 
present in an equine before a serum PRNT is positive. (ref)  
• Neutralizing antibody detected in serum by PRNT indicates past infection with WN virus 
or vaccination with WN virus vaccine; equines exposed to WN virus in prior years may 
test positive by PRNT. 
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Appendix C - National Surveillance Case Definition for Arboviral 
           Encephalitis/Meningitis, 2001 
      (available at http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/casedef/encephalitiscurrent.htm) 
 
Encephalitis or Meningitis, Arboviral (includes California serogroup, Eastern equine, St. 
Louis, Western equine, West Nile, Powassan) 




Arboviral infections may be asymptomatic or may result in illnesses of variable severity 
sometimes associated with central nervous system (CNS) involvement. When the CNS is 
affected, clinical syndromes ranging from febrile headache to aseptic meningitis to encephalitis 
may occur, and these are usually indistinguishable from similar syndromes caused by other 
viruses. Arboviral meningitis is characterized by fever, headache, stiff neck, and pleocytosis. 
Arboviral encephalitis is characterized by fever, headache, and altered mental status ranging 
from confusion to coma with or without additional signs of brain dysfunction (e.g., paresis or 
paralysis, cranial nerve palsies, sensory deficits, abnormal reflexes, generalized convulsions, 
and abnormal movements). 
 
Laboratory criteria for diagnosis 
• Fourfold or greater change in virus-specific serum antibody titer, or 
• Isolation of virus from or demonstration of specific viral antigen or genomic sequences in 
tissue, blood, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), or other body fluid, or 
• Virus-specific immunoglobulin M (IgM) antibodies demonstrated in CSF by antibody-
capture enzyme immunoassay (EIA), or 
• Virus-specific IgM antibodies demonstrated in serum by antibody-capture EIA and 
confirmed by demonstration of virus-specific serum immunoglobulin G (IgG) antibodies 
in the same or a later specimen by another serologic assay (e.g., neutralization or 
hemagglutination inhibition). 
Case classification 
Probable: an encephalitis or meningitis case occurring during a period when arboviral 
transmission is likely, and with the following supportive serology: 1) a single or stable (less than 
or equal to twofold change) but elevated titer of virus-specific serum antibodies; or 2) serum IgM 
antibodies detected by antibody-capture EIA but with no available results of a confirmatory test 
for virus-specific serum IgG antibodies in the same or a later specimen.  
Confirmed: an encephalitis or meningitis case that is laboratory confirmed. 
Comment 
 
Because closely related arboviruses exhibit serologic cross-reactivity, positive results of 
serologic tests using antigens from a single arbovirus can be misleading. In some 
circumstances (e.g., in areas where two or more closely related arboviruses occur, or in 
imported arboviral disease cases), it may be epidemiologically important to attempt to pinpoint 
the infecting virus by conducting cross-neutralization tests using an appropriate battery of 
closely related viruses. This is essential, for example, in determining that antibodies detected 
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against St. Louis encephalitis virus are not the result of an infection with WN (or dengue) virus, 
or vice versa, in areas where both of these viruses occur.  
The seasonality of arboviral transmission is variable and depends on the geographic location of 
exposure, the specific cycles of viral transmission, and local climatic conditions. Reporting 
should be etiology-specific (see below; the six encephalitides/meningitides printed in bold are 
nationally reportable to CDC): 
St. Louis encephalitis/meningitis (NETSS Event Code: 10051) 
West Nile encephalitis/meningitis (NETSS Event Code: 10056) 
Powassan encephalitis/meningitis (NETSS Event Code: 10057) 
Eastern equine encephalitis/meningitis (NETSS Event Code: 10053) 
Western equine encephalitis/meningitis (NETSS Event Code: 10052) 
California serogroup viral encephalitis/meningitis (includes infections with the following 
viruses: La Crosse, Jamestown Canyon, snowshoe hare, trivittatus, Keystone, and California 
encephalitis viruses) (NETSS Event Code: 10054) 
Other viral CNS infections transmitted by mosquitoes, ticks, or midges (e.g., Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis/meningitis [NETSS Event Code: 10055] and Cache Valley encephalitis/meningitis 
[NETSS Event Code: 10058]) 
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Appendix D - CDC-Recommended Surveillance Case Definition for WN Fever 
 
What is a CDC-Recommended Case Definition? 
CDC-recommended surveillance case definitions are prepared for use by U.S. States and 
Territories interested in conducting public health surveillance for diseases or conditions that 
have not been designated nationally notifiable and have not been officially approved and 
sanctioned by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE).  A CDC-
recommended case definition may not be approved by CSTE in the future, unless CSTE and 
the CDC program with responsibility for prevention and control of the selected disease or 





A non-specific, self-limited, febrile illness caused by infection with WNV, a mosquito-borne 
flavivirus. Clinical disease generally occurs 2-6 days (range, 2-15 days) following the bite of an 
infected mosquito. Typical cases are characterized by the acute onset of fever, headache, 
arthralgias, myalgias, and fatigue. Maculopapular rash and lymphadenopathy generally are 








1) Fourfold or greater change in WNV-specific serum antibody titer;  
 
2) Isolation of WNV from or demonstration of specific WN viral antigen or genomic 
sequences in tissue, blood, CSF, or other bodily fluid; or 
 
3) WNV-specific IgM antibodies demonstrated in serum by antibody-capture enzyme 
immunoassay and confirmed by demonstration of WNV-specific serum neutralizing 




1) WNV-specific serum IgM antibodies detected by antibody-capture enzyme immunoassay 
but with no available results of a confirmatory test for WNV-specific serum neutralizing 
antibodies in the same or a later specimen. 
 
(Note: Some WN fever cases progress to WN meningitis or encephalitis. Cases meeting the 
more restrictive case definition of WN encephalitis/meningitis should be reported as such and 






The seasonality of arboviral transmission is variable and depends on the geographic location of 
exposure, the specific cycles of viral transmission, and local climatic conditions. Because 
closely related arboviruses exhibit serologic cross-reactivity, positive results of serologic tests 
using antigens from a single arbovirus can be misleading. In some circumstances (e.g., in areas 
where two or more closely related arboviruses occur, or in imported arboviral disease cases), it 
may be epidemiologically important to attempt to identify the infecting virus by conducting cross-
neutralization tests using an appropriate battery of closely related viruses. This is essential, for 
example, in determining that antibodies detected against WNV are not the result of an infection 
with St. Louis encephalitis or dengue virus, or vice versa.  Because dengue fever and WN fever 
can be clinically indistinguishable, the importance of a recent travel history and appropriate 
serologic testing cannot be overemphasized.  In some persons, WNV-specific serum IgM 
antibody can wane slowly and be detectable for more than one year following infection. 
Therefore, in areas where WNV has circulated in the recent past, the co-existence of WNV-
specific IgM antibody and illness in a given case may be coincidental and unrelated. In those 
areas, the testing of serially collected serum specimens assumes added importance.  
 
Date case definition was developed:  October 2002 
Event Code:  10049 
Source of the case definition:  National Center for Infectious Diseases, Division of Vector-
Borne Infectious Diseases, Arbovirus Diseases Branch.  
Questions and comments about the case definition should be directed to the following 
CDC/ADB staff:   
Roy Campbell  Phone:  (970) 221-6459   E-mail:  glc5@cdc.gov 
Dan OLeary  Phone:  (970) 266-3525   E-mail:  dbo7@cdc.gov 
Tony Marfin    Phone:  (970) 266-3521   E-mail:  aam0@cdc.gov  
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Appendix E  Recommended Framework for Standardized Extended Clinical 
  Variables in Studies of Human WNV Disease 
 
Larger and more detailed case series, as well as studies of short- and long-term outcome, are 
needed to better understand the clinical features, clinical course, and public health impact of 
WNV disease in humans. A suggested framework for collecting standardized extended clinical 
variables is shown below. During 2003, CDC will work with its partners to populate this 
framework with specific questions in each category. The use of standardized questions will 
allow public health officials and other researchers to compare results more readily.  
 
1. Epi core data (e.g., age, gender, residence location, race/ethnicity, type of West Nile 
virus illness, etc.)  [Note: These are already standard ArboNET variables.] 
2. Past medical history 
3. Previous arboviral infections or vaccinations 
4. Immunosuppressed conditions 
5. New modes of transmission 
6. Clinical presentation  neurology and initial symptoms  
7. Clinical presentation  Standardized scale of neuro/physiologic function (e.g., APACHE, 
Glasgow Coma Scale, PRISM) 
8. Clinical presentation  laboratory 
9. Clinical presentation  WNV diagnostic studies 
10. Clinical presentation  Special diagnostic studies (e.g., MRI, EEG, EMG, lumbar 
puncture) 
11. Treatment (e.g., antivirals, steroids, anti-seizure medications, hyperventilation, 
interferon, intravenous immunoglobulin, plasmapharesis) 
12. Clinical course (e.g., renal function, electrolyte balance, neurologic complications) 
13. Morbidity (e.g., number of hospital-, ICU-, and ventilator-days, number and type of 
nosocomial infections, etc.)  [Note: Many of the morbidity parameters can be used in 
determining the costs of WNV disease.] 
14. Nosocomial infections 
15. Discharge disposition 
16. Neurologic and functional status at disposition, at 90 days post-discharge, and 180 days 
post-discharge 
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